Western University

Scholarship@Western
Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Repository
6-6-2018 10:30 AM

The Rise of Decentralized Autonomous Organizations:
Coordination and Growth within Cryptocurrencies
Ying-Ying Hsieh, The University of Western Ontario
Supervisor: Vergne, Jean-Philippe, The University of Western Ontario
A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Doctor of Philosophy degree
in Business
© Ying-Ying Hsieh 2018

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/etd
Part of the Business Administration, Management, and Operations Commons

Recommended Citation
Hsieh, Ying-Ying, "The Rise of Decentralized Autonomous Organizations: Coordination and Growth within
Cryptocurrencies" (2018). Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Repository. 5393.
https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/etd/5393

This Dissertation/Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Western. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Repository by an authorized administrator of
Scholarship@Western. For more information, please contact wlswadmin@uwo.ca.

Abstract
The rise of cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin is driving a paradigm shift in organization
design. Their underlying blockchain technology enables a novel form of organizing, which I
call the “decentralized autonomous organization” (DAO). This study explores how tasks are
coordinated within DAOs that provide decentralized and open payment systems that do not
rely on centralized intermediaries (e.g., banks).
Guided by a Bitcoin pilot case study followed by a three-stage research design that uses both
qualitative and quantitative data, this inductive study examines twenty DAOs in the
cryptocurrency industry to address the following question: How are DAOs coordinated to
enable growth? Results from the pilot study suggest that task coordination within DAOs is
enabled by distributed consensus mechanisms at various levels. Further, findings from
interview data reveal that DAOs coordinate tasks through “machine consensus” and “social
consensus” mechanisms that operate at varying degrees of decentralization. Subsequent
fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analyses (fsQCA), explaining when DAOs grow or decline,
show that social consensus mechanisms can partially substitute machine consensus
mechanisms in less decentralized DAOs.
Taken together, the results unpack how DAO growth relies on the interplay between machine
consensus, social consensus, and decentralization mechanisms. To conclude, I formulate
three propositions to outline a theory of DAO coordination and discuss how this novel form
of organizing calls for a revision of our conventional understanding of task coordination and
organizational growth.

Keywords
Task Coordination, Organizational Growth, Decentralized Autonomous Organization,
Blockchain, Cryptocurrency, fsQCA.
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Chapter 1 Introduction

1

Introduction
“Bitcoin is the first breed of a new type of organization that simply did not exist before . . .”
Daniel Diaz, Business Development Director, Dash

“It makes most sense to see Bitcoin . . . as a decentralized autonomous organization.”
Vitalik Buterin, co-founder, Ethereum cryptocurrency

Bitcoin is the first and most famous “cryptocurrency,” defined as a digital asset
transacted securely, transparently, and peer-to-peer by means of cryptography. At a basic
level, cryptocurrencies are powered by software that enables decentralized and
disintermediated online transactions using distributed ledger (or “blockchain”)
technology (Nakamoto, 2008; Lee, 2015). Between 2009, when Bitcoin was first
introduced, and December 2017, the market capitalization of the cryptocurrency industry
increased from nothing to $800 billion (CoinMarketCap, 2018).
One industry expert contends that, “Bitcoin is the first breed of a new type of
organization that simply did not exist before” (Daniel Diaz, interview #2, 2016). In fact,
industry experts and legal scholars alike (Atzori, 2015; Wright & De Filippi, 2015) argue
that cryptocurrency transactions all fundamentally take place within a new form of
organizing (Puranam, Alexy & Reitzig, 2014) known as the “decentralized autonomous
organization” (DAO) (Buterin, 2014). In this dissertation, I define DAOs as nonhierarchical organizations that perform and record routine tasks on a distributed,
cryptographically secured, public ledger; and that rely on the voluntary contributions of
their internal stakeholders to operate, manage, and evolve the organization through a
democratic consultation process (see also Van Valkenburgh, Dietz, de Filippi, Shadab,
Xethalis & Bollier, 2015; Dietz, Xethalis, de Filippi & Hazard, 2016).1

1

While some industry experts prefer the term “distributed organization,” I have opted for “DAO” to avoid
confusion. The term “distributed organization” is already used in the management literature to describe
work organized across geographically dispersed locations (e.g., Hinds and Kiesler, 2002; Lee and Cole,
2003; Orlikowski, 2002).
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In contrast with traditional organizations, DAOs do not have a CEO or other top
managers who “write the rulebook,” i.e., define and write governance rules into the
software code (Narayanan, Bonneau, Felten, Miller & Goldfeder, 2016: 173–175). A
DAO does not have headquarters, subsidiaries, or employees. Instead, it has “network
validators” who lend computing power to validate and record transactions on the public
ledger in exchange for compensation in the form of digital tokens that represent
ownership; for example, Bitcoin tokens represent ownership of Bitcoin currency. Rather
than having shareholders, a DAO has early adopters who can buy in during “initial coin
offerings.” A DAO makes decisions through community-based voting processes. While
DAOs can perform tasks similar to those carried out by traditional organizations, the way
in which tasks are coordinated is substantially different. In a nutshell, DAOs place
“automation at the center [and] humans at the edges” (Buterin, 2014).
The past few decades have seen the emergence of new forms of organizing. In contrast
with traditional organizations, in which tasks are determined centrally and channeled
through hierarchies, organizations such as Wikipedia, Uber, and AirBnB offer novel
solutions to such problems as division of labor and integration of effort (Puranam, Alexy
& Reitzig, 2014). Post-bureaucratic and humanistic organizations, similarly, are selfmanaging organizations rooted in “radical decentralization,” in which the degree and
scope of formal authority (e.g., reporting relationship) is hugely mitigated by
organizational democracy (Lee & Edmondson, 2017).
Despite the growing interest in alternative forms of organizing, the examples cited above
are largely owned and controlled by centralized corporations. DAOs differ from these in
terms of both design and coordination. The blockchain, meanwhile, may be understood as
a “new coordination technology,” representing not just a technological but organizational
innovation (Davidson, De Filippe & Potts, 2016a; 2016b). DAOs enable new forms of
governance and coordination by revolutionizing well-received management concepts
such as trust (Seidel, 2017). Despite the growing economic importance of DAOs,
scholars have paid insufficient attention to this intriguing phenomenon. While a few
management scholars have recently highlighted the opportunity to study the organization
design and task coordination in this new and fascinating context (Dodgson, Gann,
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Wladawsky-Berger, Sultan & George, 2015), I seek to address a more specific question,
namely:
How are DAOs coordinated to enable growth?
Given the lack of prior studies in the management literature, I will take a mixed-methods
and inductive theory-building approach to investigate how DAOs coordinate tasks
(Young-Hyman, 2017) and how such novel approaches to organizational design affect
growth. In order to answer the central research question posed above, I will rely on
fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA) as my main methodological tool, in
combination with qualitative interviews and archival data.
By theorizing about DAOs with empirical evidence, this research contributes to the
management literature in the following ways. First, I identify, describe, and analyze the
DAO as a novel form of organizing that cannot be fully explained by the extant literature.
DAOs not only provide novel solutions to the universal problems of organizing, namely
task division, task allocation, reward provision, and information flows (Puranam et al.,
2014), but, by incorporating a new class of stakeholder that integrates tasks at the
organizational level, DAOs enable an extreme form of decentralization (e.g., Baldwin &
Clark, 2006; O’Mahony, 2007; West & O’Mahony, 2008; Von Hippel & von Krogh,
2003). Second, this research enhances our understanding of DAOs by unpacking the
interplay between various coordination mechanisms and the implications of these for
organizational growth. Growth is no longer driven by the need for external financial
resources, managerial control, or power (Chandler, 1977; 1990; Perrow, 2002), but by the
essential need to provide a secure, stable, and decentralized network (Narayanan et. al.,
2016; Lee, 2015). Third, I distinguish task-level coordination from organizational-level
coordination to explore how the roles of integrative conditions, such as accountability,
predictability, and common understanding, have been shifted when applied to the study
of DAOs (Okhuysen & Bechky, 2009). Finally, DAOs can be applied to industries
beyond cryptocurrencies. This study theorizes about DAOs by proposing propositions
that shape the foundations for future work to build on. For example: how can alternative
currencies be organized in post-capitalist societies to balance the efficiency and stability
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of that society? (Cohen, 2016; Arjaliès, Hsieh & Vergne, 2017); and how does this new
form of organizing and coordination help resolve the technical and social challenges
associated with a cryptographically secured voting system (Essex & Hengartner, 2012)?

1.1

Dissertation Structure

The remainder of the dissertation is structured as follows:
Chapter 2 offers a detailed description of the cryptocurrency context, starting with
Bitcoin. In this chapter I provide readers with background information on
cryptocurrencies and explain what Bitcoin is, how Bitcoin works, and the unique features
enabled by the blockchain technology underlying Bitcoin. My goal here is to set the stage
for later conceptualization of DAOs. Chapter 3 provides a review of the literature
germane to my research question, including research on organization design,
coordination, and growth. Chapter 4 lays out an exploratory pilot study of Bitcoin, and
describes the defining features of coordination mechanisms within DAOs. Chapter 5
outlines the 3-stage research design, which extends the scope from Bitcoin to include
multiple cases with variations in coordination mechanisms and growth patterns. In the
first stage, I will inductively identify key dimensions for DAO coordination and growth
from interviews and archival data. In the second stage, I will conduct fsQCA analysis to
identify necessary and sufficient configurations for DAO growth (or decline). In the third
stage, described in Chapter 6, I will triangulate my earlier findings and supplement these
with interviews in order to propose a generalizable framework for DAO coordination and
growth. I will also present the results of the empirical analyses and inductively develop
theoretical propositions. In Chapter 7, I will discuss how my findings contribute to the
extant literature and describe future directions for research. I will conclude this
dissertation by summarizing the higher-level practical implications of my research.
Figure 1 summarizes the study stages of this dissertation and the corresponding chapters.
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Figure 1 Summary of Study Stages and Corresponding Chapters
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Chapter 2 The Context: It All Begins with Bitcoin

2

The Context: It All Begins with Bitcoin

In this chapter, I will provide descriptive background information on cryptocurrencies
starting with Bitcoin. I will then link cryptocurrencies with DAOs as the theoretical
representation.

2.1

What is Bitcoin?

Bitcoin, the first decentralized cryptocurrency ever created, is a peer-to-peer,
decentralized payment system that does not rely on centralized authorities or trusted
intermediaries such as banks (e.g., the Federal Reserve, Wells Fargo) or payment
companies (e.g., Visa, PayPal). The Bitcoin white paper was first published in 2008. In
the following year, the first “coin” (in the form of a computer file) was created and the
first Bitcoin transaction took place. The true identity of Bitcoin’s founder remains
unknown; Satoshi Nakamoto, the reputed creator, is a pseudonym of the lead developer
or development team.
A key motivation behind the creation of Bitcoin was the desire to eliminate the
inefficiencies of the intermediated banking model that has prevailed in capitalist societies
since the early 17th century2. Whereas Bitcoin was the first decentralized cryptocurrency,
the elemental technologies underlying Bitcoin had been created way before its formation.
Specifically, a large part of the development was driven by the cypherpunk movement, a
social movement advocating for libertarianism with minimal governmental interference
of the financial system in the 1980’s and 1990’s. The initial goal was to create money
that could facilitate online exchanges with the anonymity (or fungibility) of cash at the
same time. As a result, research projects based on strong online privacy and strong
cryptography were proposed. For example, David Chaum proposed digital cash systems,

2

This model is premised on the existence of national central banks whose role is to mediate the supply of
money, both directly (e.g., through the issuance of coins and bills) and indirectly (e.g., through loan-issuing
and regulated private banking). The first central bank, the Bank of Amsterdam, was founded in 1609 in the
Dutch Republic.
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DigiCash and eCash based on public key cryptography combined with centralized
electronic currency (Chaum, 1983; 1985). The idea then evolved into Wei Dai’s b-money
rooted in the privacy model of public-private key cryptography, also known as digital
signatures (Dai, 1998). Thus, ownership can be secured through the matching process
between the public key for verification and the private key for signing and accepting
funds without revealing the true identity. At around the same time, the core technology
for securing the Bitcoin network—proof-of-work cryptographic hashing, was proposed
by Adam Back’s (1997; 2002) Hashcash and Hal Finney’s (2004) creation of the first
reusable proof of work (RPOW). The idea is to build in economic cost functions to “deter
denial-of-service attacks” (Lee, 2015:10).
However, Bitcoin was the first to integrate the three technologies—public key
cryptography, digital signatures, and proof of work—to achieve distributed consensus
within a “blockchain” ledger. The resulting system is peer-to-peer and does not rely on
trusted third parties; and ensures transactional privacy and security (Wood & Buchanan,
2015:392-393). This is where the true value of Bitcoin resides. More details will be
provided in section 2.2.
As a result of the 2008 financial crisis, the public increasingly lost faith in financial
institutions. For many, Bitcoin became the logical alternative to the out-dated banking
system. Bitcoin enables a completely disintermediated, peer-to-peer system that
significantly reduces the delays and transaction fees that accompany traditional
payments, e.g., international wire transfers.
An international wire transfer between two countries typically involves four different
banks (including two “correspondent” banks), two national payments systems, and an
international settlement service (e.g., SWIFT). A standard international payment takes
between three and 15 business days to complete, depending on the destination country.
Expensive bank fees and punitive exchange rates add to the cost.
Figure 2 shows the steps involved in an international wire transfer. First, assuming a
sender in New York, USA wishes to send $1,000 USD to a receiver in London, UK, the
sender must visit a local branch or give instructions online to his bank A to transfer the
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specified amount to the receiver’s bank D in London. At this stage, Bank A charges a $25
transaction fee. Second, Bank A works with a domestic correspondent Bank B through
payment system (I) to effect the international transfer. Bank B is normally a large
international bank that has settlement agreements with banks in the receiving country.
The $25 fee is split between A and B. Third, Bank B notifies Bank C about the payment,
and transfers funds through their clearing and settlement agreements. Bank C charges a 2
per cent foreign exchange spread, which is around $20 in our case. Fourth, Bank C makes
a payment to the receiver’s bank D through another payment system (II). Finally, Bank D
transfers the $1,000 to the receiver but may charge an incoming wire fee of $15. The
entire process involves 4 banks, two national payment systems, and an international
agreement. Transaction fees and unfavorable exchange rates add up to $60 (sometimes
more) costs to the process, making it cumbersome and costly. In addition, it is a slow
process that takes up to 3 to 5 days for the transfer to complete given the number of
intermediaries involved.

Figure 2 International Clearing and Settlement

(Source: http://paymentsviews.com/2014/05/15/there-is-no-such-thing-as-aninternational-wire/ (modified))
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By contrast, Bitcoin payments are collected, validated, and updated every 10 minutes on
average in so-called “blocks” by network validators called “miners” who “can leave and
rejoin the network at will” (Nakamoto, 2008). Miners update and maintain a copy of the
blockchain, a distributed public ledger shared on the Internet across thousands of network
nodes. It is inherently borderless and protected by strong cryptography. This means that
editing the blockchain without consensual approval by stakeholders is infeasible, and that
it cannot be forged or destroyed, even by insiders. Transactions on the blockchain are
publicly auditable (Nian & Lee, 2015: 15), which results in greater transparency. No
intermediaries (e.g., banks, credit card companies, clearing houses) are required, which
reduces transaction fees by one or two orders of magnitude relative to the traditional
payments industry (i.e., users only need to pay a small fee to the miners who power and
secure the network). Thus, an international transfer of $5,000 with Bitcoin would involve
a fee3 of perhaps $2 whereas a retail bank would typically charge in excess of $100 to
complete the same transaction.
Figure 3 represents a simple comparison between traditional banking and Bitcoin
transactions.

3

Fees are given as tips, therefore they are voluntary and market based,
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Figure 3 Bitcoin vs. Traditional Banking

(Source: https://medium.com/@liamzebedee/3-essential-takeaways-from-the-mitmicrosoft-bitcoin-talk-54a4cd71a702#.l7zeppbil)

2.2

How Does Bitcoin Work ?

A payment system powered by machine routines. As a software protocol, coordination of
work is rooted in the idea that “code is law” (Lessig, 2006). In contrast to traditional
organizations that use human managers to strategically design routines, Bitcoin follows
machine routines written in the formal software protocol, which define organizational
programs such as plans, rules, and incentives. Machine routines refer to formal
agreements, such as responsibility for tasks (i.e., who does what), schedules (i.e., when
things should happen), and rules (i.e., how things should be done) written in the selfexecuting protocol.
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As a payment system, the Bitcoin protocol requires that all exchanges and contractual
relationships be broadcasted, verified, and maintained by a distributed network and
updated on a shared blockchain ledger that is append-only and tamper-proof. Bitcoin
secures its network through a “competitive bookkeeping” process called “mining”
(Yermack, 2017).
Mining is a process in which specific network nodes (“miners”) compete to validate
transactions, arrange new transactions into a sequence, and time-stamp them by solving a
“hash algorithm.” The process can be hastened by committing more computing power to
the network. Thus, a miner’s chance of being able to provide the “proof-of-work” (PoW)
required to update the ledger is proportional to the computing power s/he controls. The
computing power committed every 10 minutes to blocks of transactions recorded in the
ledger accumulates and forms a barrier to hacking, making it practically impossible to
edit past transaction records contained in the blockchain (i.e. the proof-of-work would
have to be entirely redone for every block added after the edited one, which is too
computationally intensive and too costly to achieve). Successful miners are rewarded in
Bitcoin in accordance with protocol for their work, which involves costs in hardware and
electricity, as per the Bitcoin protocol.
All miners perform the same task of collecting and verifying transactions, and compete to
solve the hash algorithm using their own computing power. Only the first miner who
solves the problem gets to record the collection of transactions on the public blockchain
ledger; the thouands who have tried and failed get nothing. This process repeats itself
every 10 minutes. As a result of mining, machine routines are able to prevent cyberattacks and to continuously keep track of transactions (Antonopoulos, 2014).
The process is not dissimilar to gold mining, insofar as rewards are determined randomly.
According to the Bitcoin white paper, “[t]he steady addition of a constant amount of new
coins is analogous to gold miners expending resources to add gold to circulation”
(Nakamoto, 2008). It would be inconceivable for a traditional business organization to
ask all employees to perform the same routine task but to only reward one person with all
other people’s effort going wasted. A system that creates thousands of redundancies is
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highly inefficient if most of the resources used as input are purposefully wasted
(Swanson, 2015)4. Yet, the counter-intuitive reward distribution process employed by
Bitcoin allows it to provide both security and decentralization (Lopp, 2016). By reducing
the likelihood of having a single point of failure, the reward distribution process makes
the system highly reliable (Swanson, 2015). Given the size of the mining network, it
would be impossible for a single miner to have enough computing power to control over
51 per cent of the representation for decision making (Nakamoto, 2008; Swanson, 2015).

2.3

Protocol Update

What happens when decisions need to be made about the code? For issues such as bugs,
code modifications, and community decisions, coordination needs to happen within and
between stakeholder groups to ensure effective communication. Formal and informal
channels exist to faciliate communication and decision making. Moreover, miners can
cast votes on the blocks they upload to siginal support for a proposed protocol change.
Take, for example, the Bitcoin Improvement Proposal (BIP), “a design document
providing information to the Bitcoin community, or describing a new feature for Bitcoin
or its processes or environment” (GitHub BIPs, 2018). The BIP addresses issues,
proposes features, or documents decisions with “concise technical specification of the
feature and a rationale for the feature” (GitHub BIPs, 2018). As shown in Figure 4, The
coordination process involves developers making a proposal, e.g., asking miners to vote
on a code implementation. A majority vote for yes would move the implementation
forward. This BIP is open and can be extended to all interested parties.

4

It is important to distinguish mining from the “winner-take-all” logic of innovation (Katz & Shapiro,
1994), in which the dominant design claims all the network effects. While slack resources are necessary for
exploratory activities involving risk-taking, experimentation, and creativity resulting in highly uncertain
outcomes that are difficult to value (March, 1991), mining is concerned with well defined, highly
formalized routine tasks with specific goals.
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Figure 4 Bitcoin Improvement Proposals (BIPs) Voting Process

(source: https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0001.mediawiki)

2.4
Bitcoin as the First Decentralized Autonomous
Organization
Bitcoin effectively “runs a payment system” and “employs subcontractors who are
miners” and who are paid “with newly issued bitcoin shares” (Latimer, as quoted by
Vigna and Casey, 2015: 229). Unlike traditional corporations, Bitcoin is a nonhierarchical organization that does not have shareholders, managers, or employees. Tasks
related to currency issuance, payment processing, and maintenance of the shared public
ledger are performed through machine routines written as open-source software, by
volunteers who contribute programming skills and computing power to the network. The
Bitcoin system thus shares the four core features common to all conceptualizations of the
“organization”: it is a “multi-agent system […] with identifiable boundaries and [a]
purpose […] towards which the constituent agents’ efforts make a contribution”
(Puranam, 2017: 6). Thus, Bitcoin is not only a technological breakthrough that
establishes the possibility of consensual agreement on the state of a distributed database
without having to rely on a trusted authority5, but also an organizational design
innovation.

5

This represents an innovative solution to an old network engineering problem known as the “Byzantine
Generals’ Problem” (Lamport, Shostak & Pease, 1982; Fisher, Lynch, and Paterson, 1985). Please see
Appendix A for detailed explanation.
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Bitcoin differs from “distributed organizations” such as Wikipedia (Lee & Cole, 2003;
Shah, 2006) by grounding its design and task coordination in a cryptographically secured
blockchain that cannot be edited without consensus among network participants. Unlike
an online encyclopedia, a payments network must be highly predictable; it cannot tolerate
the temporary editing of database entries until further verification has occurred.
Otherwise, a user who holds $1 million worth of Bitcoin could see her account balance
reduced to zero for some period of time, which would destroy her trust in the system. To
prevent this, Bitcoin puts machine routines at the center of the system, and self-interested
humans at the edges. Reliability is rooted in the code, in cryptography, and in the
distributed network rather than in intermediaries (Nian & Lee, 2015: 14-21;
Antonopoulos, 2014: 15). In other words, Bitcoin is simultaneously autonomous and
decentralized—that is, it is a “decentralized autonomous organization” (DAO). These
considerations lead us to the following question: how can tasks be adequately coordinated
to enable organizational growth without placing human decision makers at the centre?

2.5

Cryptocurrencies beyond Bitcoin

Two years after the formation of Bitcoin, a number of other DAOs were created to
compete against it in the cryptocurrency industry. For example, Peercoin introduced a
new class of machine routines that relied on “proof-of-stake” (PoS) algorithms. With
PoS, the chance that a “network validator” will be selected to add a new block of
transactions to the chain depends on her “stake” in the ecosystem, i.e., how much
cryptocurrency she owns, whereas, with PoW, her chance of being selected depends
solely on the amount of computing power she is able to commit to the network
(Narayanan et al., 2016: 40–45; 206–211). Network validators are voluntary contributors
who invest their own resources (e.g., computing power or capital in the form of digital
tokens) to maintain and secure the network in exchange for cryptocurrency rewards. In
PoW systems, network validators are known as “miners.” Hybrid implementations, with
mixed PoW and PoS mechanisms, meanwhile, provide a rich setting in which to study a
broad range of coordination mechanisms.
At the time of writing, there were more than 1,500 cryptocurrency DAOs on the market.
40 cryptocurrencies have a market capitalization of $100 million or more, including 7
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“unicorns” worth at least $1 billion (Coinmarketcap.com, July 13, 2017). Each
cryptocurrency offers its own design features and coordinates organizational tasks in
different ways in order to provide a variety of services to users looking for decentralized
and disintermediated alternatives to traditional competitors (e.g., Visa, Western Union,
Wells Fargo). It should be noted that, while our study of DAOs takes place within the
cryptocurrency industry, DAOs are also used to manage transactions of non-currency
assets such as diamonds, artwork, and shipping containers. My decision to focus on
cryptocurrencies was motivated by the fact that this industry represents the largest and
most mature sector in which the DAO form has been implemented.

2.6

Other Unique Features of Cryptocurrencies

There are a number of features that are unique to cryptocurrencies, which cannot be
found in other open source software projects. These features are mostly enabled or
enhanced by economic agents, i.e., miners or network validators, through the competitive
bookkeeping (mining) process.
Digital scarcity. Mining based on PoW is energy intensive (Swanson, 2015). Yet, it is
this very characteristic that artificially creates an “unforgeable scarcity” (Tschorsch &
Scheuermann, 2015), endowing Bitcoin with gold-like properties. It is important to note
that, while artificial scarcity can be achieved through control of the coin supply, it takes
mining to make this scarcity unforgeable and decentralized. I will elaborate on these
characteristics in following sections. At present, I will focus on the issue of scarcity per
se.
As noted above, the distribution of Bitcoin does not rely on centralized issuers, but PoW
mining. The seignorage, i.e., the difference between the cost of minting a coin and the
value of the coin, is distributed as a reward to miners as new Bitcoin issued to the market
(Swanson, 2014). “This scarcity creates a value, which is backed up by the real-world
(computational) resources required to mint it” (Tschorsch & Scheuermann, 2016). In
other words, the task of coin issuance is coordinated through artificial scarcity backed by
intensive energy consumption. The speed of coin issuance is regulated by “mining
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difficulty,” and the hash algorithm is adjusted every 14 days. For Bitcoin, scarcity is
purposeful.
Given the value generated by new coin issuance, however, the required energy
consumption seems disproportionate. It is estimated that, by 2020, Bitcoin could consume
as much electricity as Denmark (Deetman, 2016).
Immutability and Security. Recall that scarcity produced by PoW is “unforgeable”
(Tschorsch & Scheuermann, 2015). Recall as well the centrality of the concept of
immutability to Bitcoin. Immutability is reflected by the fact that once transaction records
are updated on the blockchain ledger they cannot be reversed (Lopp, 2016; Narayanan et
al., 2016).
Traditional banking is plagued by both data security and agency problems. Bank
managers and employees are under tremendous pressure to bring in new customers to
meet sales targets. Both the incentivization of opportunistic practices and misconduct are
common characteristics of the financial industry—the Wells Fargo scandal, involving 2
million fake accounts created by 5,300 employees, exemplifies the potential scale of
agent misconduct in this sector (Egan, 2016).
Bitcoin also offers a solution to the biggest security threat to any decentralized digital
payment system, namely, double spending. Double spending occurs when digital money
(e.g., digital tokens) is sent (and spent) more than once (Nian & Lee, 2015: 15).
Immutability permits high security in the Bitcoin system, thus minimizing the threat of
double spending (Swanson, 2015).
PoW consensus requires that the correct chain used for payment validation is always the
“longest chain.” The amount of work required to reverse the transaction history increases
exponentially relative to the length of the transaction history (i.e., the “block height”) and
the size of the network (Leonardos, Kiayias & Garay, 2014). The security and reliability
of Bitcoin also increase is relation to the length of the blockchain and the size of the
mining network. Any attempt to tamper with the blockchain does not make economic
sense, because an attacker needs to control over 51 per cent of the computing power of
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the entire network to assume control and dominate decision making. This is simply too
expensive (Nakamoto, 2008; Swanson, 2015). Energy consumption and the capital costs
of the mining hardware thus serve as a barrier to attempts to tamper with the blockchain
or to double spend (Torpey, 2015). As a result, the distributed network is both “resistant
to and…resilient against attack” (Killeen, 2015).

2.7
Other Features (not directly enabled through
mining)
Transparency. Transparency is another unique feature of Bitcoin. Not only is the Bitcoin
code open source for testing and development, but transactions on the blockchain are also
publicly auditable (Nian and Lee, 2015: 15). Information transparency significantly
reduces the interdependency caused by information asymmetry.
Pseudonymity. Bitcoin transactions do not require exchange parties to reveal their realworld identity. One cannot open a traditional bank account without official identification;
in the developing world, this often prevents access to banking. By contrast, anyone can
become a Bitcoin user and freely obtain a pseudonymous Bitcoin address. In essence, a
Bitcoin address is a public key cryptographically linked to a private key acting as a
password to spend funds. The key pair is for digital signatures—whereas the public key is
used to verify incoming funds, the private key is used to sign and spend funds. This
enables a new privacy model that separates transactions from identity (Nakamoto, 2008).
Figure 5 compares the Bitcoin privacy model with the traditional banking model. The
vertical bar in the New Privacy Model indicates where Bitcoin interrupts the flow of
information.
Figure 5 Traditional Privacy Model vs. the Bitcoin Privacy Model
Traditional Privacy Model (adopted from Nakamoto, 2008)

New Privacy Model
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Insofar as public keys are recorded and are trackable, Bitcoin is pseudonymous rather
than anonymous. Nevertheless, pseudonymity adds another layer of protection and
security to Bitcoin. This property endows cryptocurrencies with the cash-like
characteristics, e.g., fungibility, with interchangeable units whose value is not attached to
any user identities.

2.8

The Growth of Cryptocurrency DAOs

In the 9 years since its formation, Bitcoin’s market capitalization has increased from $0
to $300 billion (at its height). Over 450 developers regularly contribute to the code (with
many more contributing on an ad hoc basis); 200,000 transactions (worth, on average,
$3,500) are processed every day; more than 11 million user accounts, known as “Bitcoin
wallets,” currently exist (GitHub.com, 2017; Blockchain.info, 2017). To put things into
perspective, the computing (or “hashing”) power that fuels the Bitcoin DAO is 100 times
greater than that of Google.
Figure 6 indicates the geographic distribution of the Bitcoin network. Currently, there are
more than 10,000 nodes worldwide.
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Figure 6 Bitcoin Global Network

(Source: https://bitnodes.21.co/, Accessed March 2018.)
How can a DAO without centralized authority achieve market capitalization
comparable to that of such major banks as JP Morgan ($376 billion) or Bank of America
($300 billion)? How can a 9 year-old DAO perform tasks more effectively than banks
that have been around for more than a century? How can a DAO without professional
managers and employees provide faster, cheaper, and arguably more secure services than
traditional financial institutions? These questions matter to practitioners and to
management scholars alike. According to experts, the true innovation that makes this
growth possible is the way in which various stakeholders within the DAO are coordinated
and agree on the evolution of the organization (Ryan Zurrer, keynote speaker at the First
Annual Toronto FinTech Conference, 2017; Narayanan et al., 2016; Buterin, 2017a). To
understand coordination and growth within DAOs in the cryptocurrency industry requires
that we review our current thinking about organizational growth, coordination, and
consensus.
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Chapter 3 Literature Review
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In the following chapter I will review three related concepts: organizational growth,
coordination, and consensus. Using an organization design perspective, I will unpack the
novelty of DAOs and identify opportunities for theory building.

3.1
Theoretical Motivation: Why the Organization
Design Lens?
Organization design focuses on the problem of how to optimally align the internal
structure of the organization with the tasks it performs and the technological environment
in which it operates (Thompson, 1967; Tushman & Nadler, 1978; Galbreith, 1974).
Therefore, an important objective of organization design is to devise strategic solutions to
such universal problems as task division, task allocation, reward provision, and
information flows (Puranam et al., 2014). As a result, new organizational forms emerge
as strategies that may be used to enable different forms of coordination, thus highlighting
the need for organizational flexibility, learning, and change (Daft & Lewin, 1993).

3.1.1

The Divide: Organizational Innovation vs. Technological
Innovation

Organization design is currently undergoing an exciting phase of expansion and
transformation. Powered by technological innovations, new forms of communication and
collaboration have emerged. Faced with technological shifts, organizations often need to
adopt new forms to respond to the changing landscape. Organizations experiencing
technological change may adopt modular forms (Schilling & Steensma, 2001; Puranam &
Jacobides, 2006), boundary structures (O’Mahony & Bechky, 2008), or autonomous units
(Birkinshaw, Nobel & Ridderstråle, 2002) in order to deal with inter- or intraorganizational learning, integration, and innovation. It is believed that technologies
spawn new possibilities for organizational designs, which, in turn, bring about novel
forms (Daft & Lewin, 1993; Kapoor & Lee, 2013; Puranam, Singh & Zollo, 2006; Vaast
& Levina, 2006).
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In the past two decades, the scope of organization design has also been broadened from
“intentionally designed” organizations to include “emergent” organizations (Puranam et
al., 2014). Many Open Source Software Development (OSSD) projects, for example, are
managed in community forms to facilitate knowledge sharing and participation. They
follow an emergent architecture, which relies on voluntary workers to develop the
codebase (O’Mahony, 2007; O’Mahony & Ferraro, 2007; von Hippel & von Krogh,
2003; Zammuto, Griffith, Majchrzak, Dougherty & Faraj, 2007; von Krogh & von
Hippel, 2006).
Common to these organizational design themes is that they have relied on two implicit
assumptions to make sense of technologies. The first assumption is that technology may
be conceptualized as tools and artifacts that are mindfully adopted to enable certain
organizational features (e.g., virtual teams) and to influence organizational performance
(Huber, 1990; Faraj, Jarvenpaa & Majchrzak, 2011; Garud, Kumaraswamy &
Sambamurthy, 2006). In other cases, technology may be conceptualized as a product
category (as in the case of OSSD), or a context (Barley, 1986), in which organizational
forms are treated as separate entities designed to facilitate the exploitation or the
development of the technology. The second implicit assumption is that human agents are
at the centre of decision making for the four organizing problems: task division, task
allocation, reward provision, and information provision (Puranam et al., 2014).
The emergence of DAOs and blockchain technology casts doubt on these assumptions.
For DAOs, the relationship between technology and organization appears to be reversed;
alternatively, the two may be understood to have converged. In contrast to the traditional
belief that organizational innovation is enabled by technology, I will argue that
blockchain technology cannot be implementable unless organizational participants are
organized in a decentralized and autonomous manner. Yes, one can argue that the
blockchain program was made possible by the 30,000 lines of code written by Nakamoto
(2008), and that the blockchain program is indispensable to the blockchain technology
underlying DAOs. The protocol is enabled by computer science technologies, such as
cryptography, and is not so very different from other computer-aided organizational
forms. However, at least one miner and a few users need to act as “seed nodes”
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(Antonopoulos, 2014: 145), and form a “seed DAO” ex ante to kick off the
bootstrapping6 process (Narayanan et. al., 2016). For blockchain technology to enable
faster, cheaper, and secure peer-to-peer transfer of value without relying on third party
intermediaries, it is necessary to have mining that coordinates and integrates the tasks
performed by various stakeholders across different levels. This also means that
coordination, technology, and, consequently, organizational growth become intertwined.
A number of scholars have theorized about this convergence. For instance, Garud and
colleagues (2006) maintain that technology is part of organization design and plays an
important role in the evolution of the organization. Baldwin and Clark (2006) examine
the ways in which the architecture of the OSSD codebase interacts with the architecture
of the organization through code modularity and option values. These two properties are
thought to mitigate free riding, thus allowing developers’ personal interests to better align
with organizational goals (Baldwin & Clark, 2006). Neverthleless, we need to think more
about these technologies. As an organization design innovation, DAOs take our
conceptualization about technology to another level by decentralizing authority, trust, and
governance. DAOs play a central role in blockchain-based technological innovation, and
require us to think about organizational growth, coordination, and consensus at a different
level of abstraction. We need to theorize more deeply about DAOs, and the means by
which they have used codebase architecture to serve as both organizational architecture
and organizing principle.
While scholars have long acknowledged that the emergence of new forms of organization
outpaces academic research, this gap has widened as the boundaries of organization
design and technological innovation increasingly blur (Daft & Lewin, 1993; Miller,
Greenwood & Prakash, 2009). My research responds to this call by identifying DAO
organization design as the bedrock of the blockchain innovation.

6

Bootstrapping refers to the process by which the three preconditions for a cryptocurrency DAO, namely,
“the security of the blockchain, the health of the mining ecosystem, and the value of the cryptocurrency”
begin to interact with one another and reinforce one another to kickstart growth (Narayanan et al., 2016).
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3.2

Organizations as Coordination Systems

Coordination is the main focus of organizational design and redesign (Galbraith, 1973;
1974; Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967; March & Simon, 1958; Thompson, 1967; Tushman &
Nadler, 1978). An organization may be understood as a coordination system “that
integrates a collective set of interdependent tasks” (Okhuysen & Bechky, 2009).
Therefore, task coordination patterns should be adjusted to the type of interdependence in
question.
Although early conceptualization treated coordination mechanisms as inherently strategic
(Daft & Lewin, 1993), scholars have recently argued that the human agents who design
and adjust the coordination mechanisms need not be managers (Srikanth & Puranam,
2014; Okhuysen & Bechky, 2009). Coordination research also incorporates emergent
practices and bottom-up approaches to management, and adopts a dynamic perspective to
study coordination of organizational routines, learning, and the emergence of
organizational structure (Brown & Duguid, 2001; D’Adderio, 2014; Malnight, 2001;
Parmigiani & Howard-Grenville, 2011; Young-Hyman, 2017). In this line of research,
coordination mechanisms are conceived of as dynamic processes through which
organizations iterate and modify routine activities to achieve stable outcomes
(Jarzabkowski, Le & Feldman, 2012). As such, distributed coordination is made possible
through communities of practice in which collective competence, knowledge, and
capabilities are enacted rather than treated as given (Brown & Duguid, 1991; 2001;
Orlikowski, 2002).
While these recent studies have shifted the focus of organizational coordination from top
managers at the corporate level to frontline employees at the team level, they still regard
coordination as a function embedded in a hierarchy, though, this time, from the bottom
up.

3.3
What is Being Coordinated? The Nature of Task
Interdependence
Since coordination concerns the integration of interdependent tasks, the type of
coordination required corresponds closely to the nature of task interdependence
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(Thompson, 1967; Daft & Armstrong, 2012). Interdependence is defined as “the extent to
which departments depend on each other for resources or materials to accomplish their
tasks” (Daft & Armstrong, 2012). Consequently, the value generated by performing
interdependent tasks together will differ from the value generated by performing
individual tasks separately (Puranam, Raveendran & Knudsen, 2012).
Table 1 lists the classic categories of interdependence, namely, pooled (e.g., banks),
sequential (e.g., assembly line), and reciprocal (e.g., hospital) (Thompson, 1967; Daft &
Armstrong, 2012).
Table 1 Thompson’s Classification of Interdependence and Management
Implications

(Source: Daft, 2013)
Pooled interdependence, for instance, involves tasks performed independently and then
pooled back to the overall organizational level (e.g., banks divide transactions into
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independent subtasks that can be dealt with independently by various divisions and their
multiple branches). Typically, pooled tasks can be coordinated through standardized rules
and procedures due to low interdependence (Thompson, 1967; Daft & Armstrong, 2012;
Okhuysen & Bechky, 2009).
When the input of one task is dependent on the output of another, sequential or reciprocal
interdependence will be present. These two forms entail greater interdependence than the
pooled form, and thus require different types of coordination, such as feedback,
schedules, or lateral communication and mutual adjustment (Thompson, 1967; Daft &
Armstrong, 2012; Okhuysen & Bechky, 2009). The next section explains coordination
mechanisms in greater detail.

3.4

Coordination Mechanisms

Although the literature on coordination discusses both inter- and intra-organizational
levels, my research focuses on the latter. Traditionally, coordination mechanisms entail
the use of: (1) programing, i.e., coordination by programs, plans, rules, routines, targets,
and goals; (2) feedback, including mutual adjustment and communication; and (3)
hierarchy, i.e., supervision required for issues beyond programming and feedback
(Galbraith, 1973; 1974; Tushman & Nadler, 1978; Okhuysen & Bechky, 2009; Puranam
et al., 2012). The greater the uncertainty caused by task interdependence, the greater the
need for coordination.
For tasks with low interdependence, work can be coordinated through standardized
procedures, such as rules or programs, which define responsibilities and resource
allocation. Formal components, such as schedules, routines, and meetings, can be used to
implement formal coordination mechanisms (Thompson, 1967; Okhuysen & Bechky,
2009). In addition, tools and information technologies can assist teams to align their
work. For example, boundary objects allow groups to better communicate progress
(Bechky, 2003; Carlie, 2002).
As we shift from a manufacturing-centered to knowledge-based economy characterized
by greater complexity, coordination also shifts from being standardized and formal to
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being characterized by knowledge sharing (Carlile, 2002; Deken, Carlile, Berends &
Lauches, 2016), communication (Dahlander & O’Mahony, 2011), and flexibility
(Bechky, 2006). Work is aligned through the creation of mutual understanding. In
response, scholars have adopted a more dynamic view, treating coordination as an
emergent process that changes with the design (which unfolds as things happen) (Weick,
1995; Garud et al., 2006). Finally, for uncertainties and interdependence originating from
the need for supervision, formal hierarchies enable actors to use their roles to obtain
consistent understanding of project status and coordination (Bechky, 2006; Okhuysen &
Bechky, 2009; Tushman & Nadler, 1978).

3.5
Coordination without Hierarchy: The Case of
OSSD
While hierarchies based on centralized authority have traditionally served as the
backbone of organizational coordination, decentralized organizations found in the OSSD
sector have recently emerged as non-hierarchical alternatives to this model (O’Mahony,
2007). Indeed, studies on OSSD examine the possibility of decentralizing organizational
coordination in projects that govern software development through online communities,
non-profit foundations, or corporate consortia (O’Mahony & Ferraro, 2007; Dahlander &
O’Mahony, 2011; O’Mahony & Ferraro, 2007; O’Mahony, 2007; O’Mahony & Bechky,
2008; Shah, 2006). In OSSD contexts, community governance is a common feature
(O’Mahony, 2007; Shah, 2006), and projects are characterized by non-hierarchical, selforganized decision making by voluntary contributors who are motivated by practical
needs or intrinsic fulfilment (O’Mahony, 2007; Shah, 2006).
Typically, this type of coordination is based on technical contribution and open
communication. Despite being non-hierarchical, OSSD communities evolve in such a
way that certain forms of formal authority and career progression to the center are sought
after (O’Mahony & Ferraro, 2007; Dahlander & O’Mahony, 2011). For example,
contributors who do good work that gets noticed by the community gain legitimacy and
reputation over time (Dahlander & O’Mahony, 2011), and the very best (nonanonymous) contributors can acquire an informal “advisor” status, which positions them
at the center of the project’s network of stakeholders. This means that, despite a lack of
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formal hierarchy, a certain degree of centralization can emerge over time in OSSD
projects, and thus it is best to conceive of (de)centralization as a continuum, rather than
as a binary feature of organizational life.
As Mintzberg (1979) proposes, “the fundamental ways in which organizations coordinate
their work . . . should be considered the most basic elements of structure, the glue that
holds organizations together.” Given that organizations can accomplish complex tasks
with or without a formal hierarchical structure, we would argue that, although it may be
true that an organization can function without hierarchy, it certainly cannot function
without coordination.

3.6
Integrating Conditions for Coordination:
Accountability, Predictability, and Common
Understanding
A universal working assumption in early coordination research (Taylor, 1911; Fayol,
1949) is that we need human decision makers—typically, managers—to design and
adjust the “three integrative conditions for coordinated activity: accountability,
predictability, and common understanding” (Okhuysen & Bechky, 2009: 463). The three
integrating conditions provide the means for “people [to] collectively accomplish their
interdependent tasks in the workplace” (Okhuysen & Bechky, 2009). Accountability
pertains to the definition of responsibilities channeled through formal and informal
structures. Scholars have also long argued that hierarchy is a typical and effective
coordination mechanism for achieving accountability (Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967).
Predictability refers to the understanding of how subsequent tasks are related to each
other and what to anticipate (Okhuysen & Bechky, 2009). Expectations can also be
aligned among interdependent parties about their work with “predictive knowledge”
about other parties’ behavior (Puranam et al., 2012; Okhuysen, 2005). Lastly, common
understanding entails “a shared perspective on the whole task and how individuals’ work
fits within the whole” (Okhuysen & Bechky, 2009). Common understanding coordinates
work by establishing shared knowledge about specific tasks (Hoegl, Weinkauf &
Gemuenden, 2004; O’Mahony, 2003).
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Organizations can achieve these integrative conditions through various configurations of
coordination mechanisms. For instance, accountability can be enhanced by using roles in
the hierarchy and through monitoring, feedback, and communication to establish trust
(Bechky, 2003; Mark, 2002; Jarzabkowski, Le & Feldman, 2012; Okhuysen & Bechky,
2009). “Common understanding can be developed when plans are created by senior
managers and handed down a hierarchy to be implemented by those lower in the
organization” (Okhuysen & Bechky, 2009: 488). Similarly, mechanisms for allocating
resources, defining roles and responsibilities, sharing information, monitoring
performance, or creating proximity all enhance coordination by contributing to
organizational accountability, predictability, or common understanding.

3.7

Coordination and Consensus

Consensus is an important enabler for coordination in that it reflects the level of
agreement necessary for common understanding (Okhuysen & Bechky, 2009;
Kellermanns, Walter, Lechner & Floyd, 2005; St. John & Rue, 1991). According to the
definition of Kellermanns and colleagues (2005), strategic consensus is defined as “the
shared understanding of strategic priorities among managers at the top, middle, and/or
operating levels of the organization” (Kellermanns, Walter, Lechner & Floyd, 2005).
Despite being ubiquitous in organization studies, the nature of consensus has mostly been
discussed as a state in which top management teams, groups, or organizational control
systems are employed for effective coordination (Mintzberg, 1979: 142; Barker, 1993;
Amason, 1996; St. John & Rue, 1991). For example, Barker (1993) delineates how value
consensus among self-managed team members enables “concertive control” (based on
normative rules) through manifests, resulting in a flatter organization. At the
organizational level, the viability of consensus is contingent upon various internal and
external resource constraints (Dess, 1987; Dess & Origer, 1987; Homburg et al., 1999).
At the field level, institutional theorists have studied how consensus forms and falls apart
in the formative stage of a field, during which conflict can be resolved through
communication, managerial authority, formal or informal rhetoric, and action (Grodal &
O’Mahony, 2015). Overall, consensus is considered a desired state or “common end” for
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both centralized and emergent strategic decision making as it facilitates coordination
(Grodal & O’Mahony, 2015; St. John & Rue, 1991).
In addition to a “common end” state, consensus is also treated as a by-product of the
group approach toward strategic decision making (Schweiger, Sandburg & Ragan, 1986;
Amson, 1996; Eisenhardt & Zbaracki, 1992). “Human systems ought to have a clear,
consensus-based goal to guide behavior” (Bourgeois, 1980). The assumption is that
consensus facilitates decision-making quality and performance outcomes (Amason,
1996). While studies on consensus focus primarily on strategic decision making among
top managers in the strategy formulation stage (e.g., Bourgeois, 1980; Dess, 1987; Dess
& Origer, 1987; Eisenhardt & Zbaracki, 1992; Homburg, Krohmer & Workman Jr.,
1999; Priem, 1990), consensus in the strategy implementation stage receives relatively
little attention.
This is because the scope of consensus research mainly focuses on the role of top
managers. The conjecture is that once the top management team agrees on the goals and
actions of a policy, organizational members (i.e., employees) follow the mandates that
have been agreed upon. There is a clear group of “strategic decision makers,” devising
goals and policy alternatives either following a rational-comprehensive logic or a
political-incremental rationale in the strategy formulation stage (Bourgeois, 1980; Dess &
Origer, 1987; Wooldridge & Floyd, 1989; Kellermanns, Walter, Lechner & Floyd, 2005).
In recent years, consensus at much lower levels of the organization has begun to receive
attention from scholars studying less-hierarchical self-managing organizations (Lee &
Edmondson, 2017). For example, organizations such as Zappos or Ternary adopt an
organizational system called Holacracy, in which individuals are directed by role-based
definition rather than managers (Bernstein, Bunch, Canner & Lee, 2016). Full autonomy
is granted to organizational members who follow formal role definitions but, at the same
time, have the flexibility to discuss rule changes in “governance meetings.” Members
propose, discuss, and consent to proposals in governance meetings to activate change.
Similarly, in participatory decision making, consensual agreement serves as the means of
organizational governance (Black & Gregersen, 1997). Overall, for organization designs
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in which authority is distributed, consensus about the normative features of the
organization—how different roles should be defined or how work should be designed is
bottom-up and formed among the participants (Lee & Edmondson, 2017). With an
emphasis on the task level, the literature on self-managing organizations extends the
scope of consensus from the management level to the operating level and from top-down
to bottom-up.
Arguably, blockchain-based consensus is of a different nature. Instead of agreeing on the
normative features, organizational participants agree on the basic facts in a deterministic
way. The DAO network must, for instance, agree on which transactions have taken place,
when they happened, and who relayed which block of transactions (e.g., as in blockchain
explorers such as https://btc.com/). In section 3.9 and in Chapter 4, I will elaborate on
how the idea of consensus has shifted in blockchain-based organizations.

3.8

Coordination and Growth

With or without a hierarchy, a properly coordinated organization should be able to scale
its operations. Specifically, coordination affects organizational growth by enhancing—
and sometimes balancing—efficiency (Nickerson & Silverman, 2003) and effectiveness
(Doty, Glick & Huber, 1993; Lewin & Minton, 1986).

3.8.1

Growth based on Efficiency

From the standpoint of efficiency, organizations are more successful than markets in
coordinating activities with high transaction costs; this is a key determinant for the
expansion of organizational boundaries (Williamson, 1975). On the other hand,
knowledge-based conceptualizations suggest that organizations are more efficient at
coordinating knowledge assimilation, transfer, and integration (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990;
Kogut & Zander, 1992; 1993; 1996; Garicano & Wu, 2012; Whetten, 1987). Managers
typically assume a strategic role in designing the organizational structure by which tasks
are allocated and integrated for enhanced efficiency, i.e., by way of optimal resource
deployment (Faraj and Xiao, 2006).
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Through social relationships, top managers are able to make decisions on resource
allocation and capability building, leading to more effective exploratory and exploitative
innovation and growth (Lavie, Stettner & Tushman, 2010; March, 1991). Similarly, in the
case of new ventures or community-based non-profits, organizational growth relies on
coordination based on social resources and social capital (Khaire, 2010; Galaskiewicz,
Bielefwld & Dowell, 2006), founding team human capital (Tzabbar & Margolis, 2017;
Baum & Bird, 2010), and development of managerial strategies to foster external
partnership with high-status firms (Khaire, 2010). Coordinating through social
relationships provides a basis for reputation and trust building within the organization,
which brings down communication costs and enhances efficiency.
In non-hierarchical OSSDs, communities can evolve in such a way that certain forms of
leadership emerge through the identification of informal advisors recognized as
authoritative by community members (O’Mahony & Ferraro, 2007; Dahlander &
O’Mahony, 2011). However, meeting efficiency requirements can be trickier in
community-based organizations in which decision-making power is diffused and in
which organizational members can come and go at will (O’Mahony & Ferraro, 2007;
Okhuysen & Bechky, 2009).

3.8.2

Growth based on Effectiveness

From an effectiveness perspective, coordination also helps organizations achieve their
goals by increasing the fit between the internal and external environment (Argote, 1982;
Crowston, 1997; Galbraith, 1973, 1974; Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967; Srikanth & Puranam,
2014; Thompson, 1967; Tushman & Nadler, 1978). For example, coordination
mechanisms such as planning, sharing updates, or trust building can help to mobilize
organizational members around goals and objectives that are aligned with customer
needs.
Overall, organizations are able to capitalize on efficiency and effectiveness and to
achieve growth by mechanisms such as communication, routine, and learning (Starbuck,
1965; Whetten, 1987; Salomon & Martin, 2008). Note that the relationship between
coordination and growth is particularly important for organizations that rely on network
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effects to scale. In fact, much of the OSSD literature attends to how community
governance is linked to growth-enhancing network externalities (O’Mahony & Lakhani,
2011; West & O’Mahony, 2008; Dahlander & O’Mahony, 2011).

3.9
Opening the Black Box of Coordination within
DAOs
How, in the absence of top management and a centralized decision-making process that
ensures optimal efficiency and effectiveness, do DAOs coordinate tasks and achieve
growth?
DAOs represent a case in which exchanges of value take place in non-hierarchical
organizations governed by peer-to-peer, open networks. In many ways, DAOs epitomize
an extreme form of decentralized organization. However, DAOs’ defining features go
beyond decentralization and represent an under-socialized organizational terrain yet to be
explored. According to the original Bitcoin white paper, which encapsulates key elements
of Bitcoin’s coordination mechanisms, “nodes work all at once with little coordination.
They do not need to be identified, since messages are not routed to any particular place
and only need to be delivered on a best effort basis. Nodes can leave and rejoin the
network at will, accepting the proof-of-work chain as proof of what happened while they
were gone” (Nakamoto, 2008).
While it may be true that DAOs in the cryptocurrency industry require “little
coordination” compared to traditional payment corporations, what is more striking is the
fact that some of the coordination mechanisms on which DAOs rely are completely new.
Scholars have always seen human agents (from managers to frontline staff) as the main
source of task coordination. But DAOs, by placing “automation at the center [and]
humans at the edges” (Buterin, 2014) of the organization, coordinate tasks using opensource software and a distributed ledger. Moreover, while DAOs rely on a communitybased form of governance, they differ fundamentally from OSSD projects in terms of
organization design and task coordination mechanisms. In fact, DAOs achieve
accountability, predictability, and common understanding—the three integrative
conditions for coordination (Okhuysen and Bechky, 2009)—in ways previously unseen.
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Specifically, for DAOs to secure the network without a third-party intermediary vouching
for every single exchange, agreement needs to be reached among the network validators.
We need a way for the payee to know that the previous owners did not sign any
earlier transactions […] The only way to confirm the absence of a transaction is to
be aware of all transactions […] To accomplish this without a trusted party,
transactions must be publicly announced 7, and we need a system for participants to
agree on a single history of the order in which they were received. The payee needs
proof that at the time of each transaction, the majority of nodes agreed it was the
first received.
[The Bitcoin white paper, Nakamoto, 2008]
To provide security, consensus based on unanimity rule appears to be deterministic and
central in DAOs insofar as every node runs the same protocol and agrees on one and only
one true state of the blockchain ledger. However, unanimity rule in organization research
is little studied. Romme (2004) argues that unanimity rule at a critical threshold enhances
the organization’s performance and the quality of its decision making. Unsurprisingly,
Romme found that large groups are less responsive to unanimity rule than small units in a
hierarchical structure. Unanimity rule is uncommon in traditional organizations, hence
the lack of visibility in the literature. For traditional banks, the ledger is a database that
stores transaction information and is separate from the evolution of the organization
itself. This is not the case for DAOs, for whom consensus on the true state of the ledger is
a prerequisite and a centripetal force which holds the organization together.
To conclude, in contrast to the extant literature that treats consensus as a state, common
end, or by-product, for DAOs consensus is a precondition for task coordination. A lack of
consensus implies a rejection of the organizing principle, which can bring progression to
a halt or result in organizational division. How we think about consensus within such a
sizable network requires that we take the consensus concept to a different level of
abstraction and place it in the forefront of DAO coordination. I will discuss the notion of

7

W. Dai, "b-money," http://www.weidai.com/bmoney.txt, 1998. Original citation in Nakamoto, 2008.
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consensus and the lack thereof in Chapter 4, which details a pilot case study of the black
box of coordination within DAOs using Bitcoin as the primary example.
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Chapter 4 Distributed Consensus: The Case of Bitcoin
Distributed Consensus: The Case of Bitcoin*

4

* This chapter draws heavily from my paper “Bitcoin and the rise of decentralized
autonomous organizations” co-authored with Dr. Jean-Philippe Vergne, forthcoming in
the Organization Zoo Series of Journal of Organization Design.
This chapter outlines a pilot case study and is intended to be descriptive and explanatory.
My goal here is to identify the defining features of task coordination mechanisms within
DAOs and to answer the following question:
How are decentralized autonomous organizations coordinated?
As the first and most established DAO, Bitcoin serves as a prototype, and allows for a
deep understanding of DAO coordination. Launched in 2009, Bitcoin, with its underlying
blockchain technology, has been characterized as a game changer by the mainstream
media (e.g., the Economist, 2015a, 2015b; Wadhwa, 2015). As noted in Chapter 2,
Bitcoin’s market capitalization was $300 billon at its peak in in December 2017,
equivalent to that of Bank of America — only that Bitcoin was created out of a piece of
software code! Given its significance as a DAO and its real-world economic impact,
Bitcoin provides valuable data and a rich setting for my research.
For the sake of clarity, throughout this chapter “Bitcoin” (upper case) will be used to
refer to the DAO, while “bitcoin” (lower case) will be used to refer to the cryptocurrency
tokens.

4.1

Research Design: A Pilot Case Study

Case studies serve as an appropriate method to build theories (e.g., Gersick, 1988;
Gilbert, 2005) and as a source from which theoretical insights may be derived from rich
data. For novel phenomena that are little understood and cannot be fully explained by
extant theories, a case study may be used to inductively investigate emerging patterns and
their underlying logic (Eisenhardt, 1989; Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007; Siggelkow,
2007).
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In the course of my research, I collected data on Bitcoin from its formation in 2009
through 2017. Between July 2016 and March 2018, I conducted twelve 60- to 90-minute
semi-structured interviews with 13 industry experts who have direct experience or
relevant knowledge of Bitcoin. Interviewees included Bitcoin developers, Bitcoin
Improvement Proposal (BIP) authors, cryptocurrency miners, and experts on
cryptocurrency start-ups. Questions revolved around two categoriess, namely: (1) what is
the defining feature of coordination within Bitcoin which distinguishes it from OSSD;
and (2) how do stakeholders 8 coordinate tasks at various organizational levels? With
these primary questions in mind, I also inquired into the communication and decisionmaking processes characteristic of a DAO like Bitcoin. The interview guide is included in
Appendix B.
In addition to conducting interviews, I studied documents such as white papers, BIPs,
technical and non-technical archives, academic papers, and industry reports. Finally, I
accessed important online data at the blockchain level (e.g., blockchain.info), protocol
level (e.g., GitHub Bitcoin repositories at https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin), peer-to-peer
network level (e.g., bitinfocharts.com), organizational level (e.g., coinmarketcap.com),
and community level (e.g., the Bitcoin sub-reddit at https://www.reddit.com/r/Bitcoin/).
Using multiple data sources enhanced the robustness of my findings (Eisenhard, 1989).
I went back and forth between the extant literature and the data I obtained to support
subsequent theory building. Follow-up data collection was required to ensure internal
validity. The goal was to arrive at a convergent theoretical framework that was tightly
linked with empirical evidence (Eisenhardt, 1989).

8

Throughout this dissertation, I define organizational boundaries to include those network actors who
directly maintain or provide services for the decentralized autonomous organization. In the case of Bitcoin,
internal stakeholders of interest include network validators (i.e., miners) and developers.
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4.2
4.2.1

Findings
Two Major Types of Task at Various Levels

To understand how DAOs coordinate tasks to solve the universal problems of organizing,
I will first identify the tasks performed by Bitcoin.

4.2.1.1

Task #1: Network Validation at the Blockchain and Protocol
Levels

Bitcoin represents a partial substitute for banks, albeit with notable differences. First, at
an aggregate level, traditional banks store transaction histories in a centralized fashion.
Users only get to view their personal bank statements and must trust that their
information is protected from both cyber attacks and employee misconduct. Traditionally,
banks employ clerks to process payments. Human agents are prone to agency problems
which can lead to misconduct, such as theft. Human agents are also expensive. With
Bitcoin, all transactions are recorded publicly and electronically onto the immutable
blockchain and stored in a distributed fashion across thousands of network nodes. As a
result, records are easier to maintain, and cyber attacks are less likely to succeed
(transaction information is not held in one central location). The blockchain technology
provides the multi-site copies of “ledgers,” which are essentially aggregations of past
transactions (like a bank account statement). The technology also provides encryption to
validate transactions. This is similar to the personal security devices used in online
banking, which generate a unique transaction-specific signature based on a personal key.
Second, whereas banks prevent double-spending by checking for funds sufficiency in a
centralized server, in a peer-to-peer system like Bitcoin, payees cannot verify whether
payers still have the funds they claim to have due to unpredictable network delays (e.g.
an email sent now can reach its recipient before another email sent a minute earlier). To
resolve this issue, the Bitcoin network relies on cryptographic routines to verify,
timestamp, and order transactions in a non-reversible way, thereby avoiding the need for
human reconciliation. The key idea is that somebody in the network will legitimately
time stamp a block of transactions, but we cannot predict who that will be (e.g. replacing
a bank clerk, who can be corrupted to fake time stamps, with a system that cannot be
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corrupted). Table 2 illustrates the difference in coordination between Bitcoin and
traditional banks and payment organizations.
Table 2 Forms of Organizing: Banks and Payment Organizations vs. Bitcoin
(Adopted from Hsieh & Vergne, 2017)
Goal

Provision of a Payment System
Banks and Payment Organizations

Bitcoin

Main Task

Payment processing: verification,
validation, recording, settlement,
clearing, reconciliation

Network validation: broadcasting,
verification, validation and recording.

Mechanism

Centralized hierarchies

Mining: competitive bookkeeping

Task
Division

Centralized task division by job
descriptions/ definitions, divided
by formal organizational structure

Task division is based on the criterion of
computing power dedicated to mining and
is automated by the blockchain software in
a decentralized fashion.

Task
Allocation

Assigned by formal hierarchies

Miners self-select in the network.
However, competitive bookkeeping only
allocates payment validation tasks to the
winning miner (essentially chosen at
random, though the probability of winning
is proportional to the computing power
committed).

Reward
Defined by formal compensation/
Distribution incentive programs. In general,
reward schemes are not publicly
available.

Automated, randomized, transparent.
Linked with task allocation through
competitive bookkeeping.

Information
Flows

Transaction history is recorded in the
blockchain, which is publicly auditable
and immutable. Information is distributed
among network nodes and all nodes have
to run the same software protocol and keep
the same transaction record on the
blockchain public ledger.

Centrally controlled by
organizational rules.
Inconsistencies can persist across
teams, divisions, or subsidiaries.
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For network validation tasks, coordination is achieved through a process whereby the
blockchain produces agreement (aided by miners’ efforts) on the ordering of transactions
through the timestamping created by miners’ success at guessing random numbers
generated by the protocol (Hsieh & Vergne, 2017).

4.2.1.2

Task #2: Protocol Update at the Peer-to-Peer Network
Level

Underlying the Bitcoin payment system is the blockchain software supported by ongoing
protocol updates (Wang & Vergne, 2017). In terms of governance, miners voting on
protocol update proposals resemble the community-based management OSSD observed
in projects such as Linux. This aligns stakeholder expectations (Lopp, 2016), and
facilitates knowledge sharing, problem solving, and the realization of collective outcomes
(O’Mahony & Lakhani, 2011). Like OSSD, Bitcoin software development is also open
source, decentralized, and community based. Bitcoin communities of volunteer software
developers collaborate in a non-hierarchical network and self-select into tasks and roles
based on expertise and preference. Over time, a team of core Bitcoin developers has
formed and become increasingly influential in the community, even though their work is
not funded by a centralized organization, but by a sponsorship program that relies on
donations.
The key organizational novelty of Bitcoin is that, in addition to developers, miners play
an equally important role in protocol modification. Specifically, Bitcoin software is
updated through BIPs, which are design documents proposing new features, changes, or
processes for the protocol. BIPs allow developers to make proposals on software updates
that miners must vote on. Proposals are first reviewed by BIP editors, and miners then
indicate a “yes” or “no” vote in a block during the polling period (e.g., 100 blocks
totalling 1,000 minutes). Voting power is proportional to the computing power a miner
contributes to the network. A code change will only be implemented when 55 per cent of
voters approve a given proposal (Franco, 2014: 90). Table 3 compares OSSD with
Bitcoin software development in light of the four core dimensions of organizing: task
division, task allocation, reward distribution, and information flows (Puranam, Alexy &
Reitzig, 2014).
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Table 3 Updating Software Protocol: Open-Source Software Development vs.
Bitcoin
(Adopted from Hsieh & Vergne, 2017)
Goal

Protocol Update
OSSD

Bitcoin

Main Task

Software development

Standard development

Mechanism

Community governance

Voting: Bitcoin improvement
proposals (BIPs)

Task
Division

Some centralization based on the
structure provided by the founder;
evolvable with community.

Founder is unknown; BIPs proposed
by developers and voted on by miners
coordinate code modification.
Centralization is undesirable.

Task
Allocation

Open participation through selfselection into the community

Developers contribute to code
upgrades through open participation
and self-selection. Miners vote on the
protocol change based on computing
power.

Reward
Distribution

Intrinsic motivation,
professionalism, visibility,

Developers volunteer and are
motivated by intrinsic motivation.
Miners are paid in Bitcoin and are
driven by mining profitability.

Information
Flows

Information is processed through
“virtual support infrastructure and
tools” (Puranam et al., 2014)

Information is shared and
communicated through BIP
communication on the code repository
(i.e., GitHub) and reflected in miners’
voting outcomes on the blockchain.

We can compare tasks performed by Bitcoin and OSSD in terms of their goals, their
coordination, and the subsequent security requirements.
So development for the individual clients is very much like Linux and Python and
so on … it's an open source project that welcomes contributions from anyone …
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But the goal … isn't quite the same because you're not developing a, a piece of
software, you're developing a standard, or a set of rules. That means that … it
doesn't quite work the same way because you can't just commit a change in the
code … It relies on human validation and so forth . . . It's not software
development, it's standard development. [Nick Johnson, interview #26]
Since protocol update in Bitcoin means setting up standards for the entire network to
follow, this necessarily affects consensus layer.
It's very similar. The only difference is probably the consensus layer, which is not
so highly fragile in Linux or other open sources . . . when you look at Linux, there
is not much in [terms of] consensus—maybe some drivers need to follow a
standard and it doesn't hurt too much if you don't. While in Bitcoin if the
consensus changes then you at the end have two chains like we have now with
Bitcash and Bitcoin. And this is like an additional element, you not only split the
[software] distribution like Linux, Ubuntu, as Debian, but you kind of split the
financial system. [Jonas Schnelli, interview # 21]
This leads to some fundamental differences between cryptocurrencies and other securitycritical projects.
Bitcoin and Namecoin and Monero are security critical projects. And so, if you compare
any security critical project . . . to a typical open source project that's not security
critical, there will definitely be a much a higher standard involved for [the]
security critical project, just because the stakes are higher if something goes
wrong . . . so that's one aspect. The other aspect is that cryptocurrencies are
decentralized consensus protocols . . . which interact [with economic agents] in
weird ways . . . which historically have never all interacted at once before
cryptocurrencies existed . . . There tend[s] to be a much higher standard for those
systems compared even to other security critical projects.
interview #31]

[Jeremy Rand,
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According to Nick Johnson, a major difference between developing a standard and
developing a piece of code is that “a lot of the best practices in software development
can’t be applied” (interview #26). The distinction between “software development” and
“standard development” points to a fundamental difference between Linux and Python,
on the one hand, and cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin, on the other. This creates an
intriguing scenario whereby a straightforward software update in OSSD could have
complex interactions with a decentralized consensus system. A security update that
would normally be deployed as quickly and as broadly as possible in OSSD, could be
deemed to pose a security threat to Bitcoin.
[N]ormally in a security critical project, if some other project that's a
codependency of yours releases a security update, normally you would want to
merge that as fast as possible and deploy to everyone as fast as possible . . .
because how could a security update be a security issue in itself? Right? But in the
context of things like Bitcoin, Namecoin and Monero, [if] I'm merging a security
update for dependency without being very careful about how you test its
interaction with the existing system, that can actually introduce security issues of
its own.

[Jeremy Rand, interview #31]

Thus, these two categories of task, network validation and protocol update, lead to
important insights into the nature of “distributed consensus.”

4.2.2

Distributed Consensus Mechanisms: The Defining Feature
of Task Coordination in Bitcoin
“Any needed rules and incentives can be enforced with this consensus
mechanism.” (Nakamoto, 2008)

As the Bitcoin white paper rightly concludes, it is an almost insurmountable task to study
coordination within Bitcoin without touching on the concept of consensus. Jeremy Rand
elaborated:
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Bitcoin is basically the first ever implementation of what's called a decentralized
consensus protocol, which basically means I'm having a large number of users 9 on
the Internet, who by some mechanism all end up coming to an exact agreement on
an order to [the] series of events . . . this was the problem that was previously
believed to be impossible to solve. There was actually a mathematical
impossibility . . . and [B]itcoin ends up taking advantage of a really interesting
loophole in the important proof and basically solves it by relying on both
cryptography and economic incentives rather than just cryptography. [Jeremy
Rand, interview #31]
The “mathematical impossibility” mentioned by Rand refers to the Fischer-LynchPaterson theorem, which demonstrates the impossibility of reaching consensus about the
true state of the network in a distributed network with dishonest actors (Fischer, Lynch &
Paterson, 1985). Distributed consensus (or in computer science terms, decentralized
consensus) is at the heart of Bitcoin’s coordination mechanism for network validation
tasks.
By design, network validators (e.g., Bitcoin miners) only belong to a DAO if the protocol
is unanimously adopted. “You only use the system that has the rules that you agree with”
(Nick Johnson, interview #26). Consensus is no longer a state, but a set of rules that must
be met for the organization to function and which serves as a prerequisite for organization
members adopting the same protocol to stay in the same network. Think about how
miners must agree on the true state of the ledger; consider how the network agrees on
which protocol to follow (e.g., Bitcoin vs. Bitcoin Cash10), and how miners cast votes to
signal support for important updates proposed by developers through BIPs or other

9

According to the interviewee, “users” refers to all “miners (or network validators)” and “full nodes” who
run the same Bitcoin protocol and keep the entire history of Bitcoin blockchain on their computer.
10

Bitcoin Cash is a hard fork of Bitcoin that features a larger block size to enable faster transaction
processing.
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platforms—these are characteristics specific to cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin but not
to OSSD. Specifically, consensus rules for network validation are deterministic.
[E]very single user on the Bitcoin peer-to-peer network, they need to come to [a]
deterministic conclusion about what the state of the blockchain is. And even a
trivially insignificant change in how they ended up computing . . . even if it's just
one very obscure signature in one transaction and the entire blockchain isn't valid
anymore. If there's even one tiny deviation, then they will fail to come to a
deterministic agreement on what the state of the blockchain is. And as a result of
that, that means suddenly now there's a disagreement on who has how much
money . . . And the only way that Bitcoin can work is if everyone is in 100
percent deterministic agreements on that state. [Jeremy Rand, interview #31]
Thus, blockchain-based consensus is distinctive in that it requires all participants to agree
on basic organizational facts and states instead of outlining a common strategic goal for
members to follow. In other words, blockchain-based consensus no longer attends to the
ends of coordination (i.e., the desired outcome), but the mechanisms of coordination.
Blockchain-based consensus is guided primarily by formal rules and supported by
informal communication among stakeholders. Traditionally, coordination mechanisms
such as plans, rules, and routines were intended to foster agreement among organizational
members and contribute to a common understanding (Okhuysen & Bechky, 2009). In the
case of Bitcoin, by contrast, consensus is a default, i.e., a pre-condition for coordination
at the blockchain and protocol levels.
Before getting into a finer-grained view of “how” consensus mechanisms work, we first
need to understand “who” the internal stakeholders with direct decision-making power
actually are.

4.2.3

Defining Organizational Boundaries: Internal Stakeholders of
DAOs

Although in practice, there are various types of nodes in the extended Bitcoin network
connected by various protocols (see Figure 14-15 in Appendix C), in this study, I will
adopt the generally accepted definition of a cryptocurrency network as a collection of
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nodes running a cryptocurrency protocol. Organizational boundaries are drawn to include
only those nodes running the Bitcoin protocol, i.e., those connected by the orange ties in
Figure 16 in Appendix C.
Specifically, I focus on two classes of stakeholder groups: miners and developers. The
choice is based on their level of direct decision-making power and involvement in task
coordination.
Who has agency? Every human participant in the Bitcoin network has agency. As the
Bitcoin white paper states, “nodes can leave and rejoin the network at will” (Nakamoto,
2008). Members make voluntary decisions to join the network and self-select into roles.
Joint decisions are made through democratic community voting.
Who has power? According to Narayanan and colleagues (2016:173-175), there are a
few internal stakeholder groups that have power, including: developers, who write the
code as a rulebook that everyone uses; and miners, who compete to write the history and
validate transactions. Externally, investors can influence the value of DAOs by holding
Bitcoin and users can utilize cryptocurrency to transfer value. Other external stakeholders
include: regulators, merchants, and customers, who generate basic demands for
cryptocurrency; and payment services, exchanges, and wallet providers who handle
transactions. In general, external stakeholders build their products and services upon the
Bitcoin blockchain and protocol. This classification is in line with how industry experts
think about the difference between internal and external stakeholders in terms of
governance: “we have kind of two cohorts or two classes of network participants, you
know, what I call the retail layer or the end users and then what I call the utility or the
keepers in general with respect to governance” (Ryan Zurrer, Principal and Venture
Partner at Polychain Capital, interview # 30).
The “keepers” referred to by Zurrer correspond to internal stakeholders, whereas the
“retail layer” or “end users” correspond to external stakeholders. In this dissertation, I
will focus on those internal stakeholders—developers and miners—who have a direct
influence on operations, decision-making, and the value of the cryptocurrency. External
stakeholders are beyond the scope of this study.
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Who are the “shareholders”? Anyone who owns bitcoin has “shares”. Investors and
users hold and transact with bitcoin, the value of which is demonstrated by market
capitalization and the total number of transactions (Narayanan et al., 2016: 47, 173).
The following section examines the consensus mechanisms corresponding to tasks at the
blockchain and protocol levels.

4.2.4

Consensus Mechanism at the Blockchain and Protocol level:
Coordinating Network Validation

At both the blockchain and protocol levels, mining based on consensus provides the
utility layer necessary for DAOs such as Bitcoin. Ryan Zurrer called this class of network
participant the “keeper.”
[T]hat utility layer, that’d be called keeper, [which] provides a specific resource or
. . . a function to the network. So either it provides storage and computation or
maybe it does validation or something like that . . . these sort[s] of permissionless
actors can come and go and, and in providing the specific resource to the network
for the retail layer, for the end users, end users get to use of that network basically
nearly for free. [Ryan Zurrer, Principal and Venture Partner at Polychain Capital,
interview #30]
In the case of Bitcoin, miners are the main providers of value in the network. In
accordance with the coordination of machine routines in the Bitcoin protocol, Bitcoin
keeps its maximum block size at 1MB. Bitcoin is also able to maintain a stable block
generation speed averaging 10 minutes per block; this ensures that the Bitcoin blockchain
size (i.e., the total number of blocks in the blockchain) grows at a constant speed (see
Figure 7). To make sure this happens, the consensus mechanism needs to take into
account the expansion of network computing power, which directly influences miners’
probability of solving hashes. Figure 8 shows the growth trajectory of the Bitcoin hash
rate, which is the number of calculations the mining network performs each second.
Every 14 days the machine routine adjusts the difficulty of the mathematical puzzles
generated by the mining algorithm so that the average block time remains stable (see
Figure 9). Over the course of the last three years (2015-2018), the slope of the Bitcoin
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blockchain size growth curve (see Figure 7) remained constant while the slope of
difficulty (see Figure 9) increased exponentially in response to the soaring growth in
network computing power indicated in Figure 8.
Miners are profit driven. The Bitcoin machine routine thus coordinates the reward
distribution schedule to miners with new bitcoin injected into the economy in a
deflationary fashion. At its launch in 2009, the initial reward started off at 50 BTC 11. It is
programed to halve approximately every 4 years until 2140, when the maximum supply
of 21 million BTC is expected to run out (https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Controlled_supply).
Figure 7 Bitcoin Blockchain Size (MB)
(Defined as “the total size of all block headers and transactions. Not including database
indexes.)”

(Source: blockchain.info)

11

BTC is the unit of one bitcoin. Additionally, while the upper case “Bitcoin” refers to the name of the
cryptocurrency and decentralized autonomous organization, the lower case “bitcoin” stands for the
currency itself.
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Figure 8 Bitcoin Hash Rate (TH/s)
(Defined as “the estimated number of terahashes per second (trillions of hashes per
second) the Bitcoin network is performing.”)

(Source: blockchain.info)
Figure 9 Bitcoin Difficulty
(Defined as “a relative measure of how difficult it is to find a new block. The difficulty is
adjusted periodically as a function of how much hashing power has been deployed by the
network of miners.”)
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(Source: blockchain.info)
For Bitcoin and other DAOs, the consensus mechanism that coordinates network
validation tasks at the blockchain protocol level requires that every node in the network
run the Bitcoin protocol and that everyone keeps the same copy of the blockchain ledger.
According to Hudson Jameson, “You show that you agree to the consensus by running
the software. And if you chose to run the software or a different software or a modified
version of the software, that's you disagreeing” (interview #32).
The amount of “work” committed to PoW mining serves as a cost to validate the
network. This “ante” cost makes Bitcoin highly resistant to cyber attacks. According to
Adam Reeds, Vice President, Energy and Infrastructure at Dream, and an expert in
mining, “if you think about a game of poker, if you're betting on the result of it, it's like
you're ante” (interview #29). Reeds’ business partner, Mauricio Di Bartolomeo,
elaborated: “[B]itcoin is the honeypot. Everybody's trying to get a piece of it and nobody
has been able to. That’s why it is where it is” (interview #29).
It follows that Bitcoin’s true organizational novelty lies in those unique solutions
consensus-based mining provides to organizing. Coordination is characterized by: (1)
pre-determined task division written into the protocol; (2) randomized task allocation that
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is proportional to computing power; (3) randomized reward distribution subject to task
assignment; and (4) peer-to-peer information flow among network nodes in the
blockchain. It is important to note that the Bitcoin code does not assume away the
problem of agency costs. Rather, Bitcoin explicitly deals with these long-standing
problems by incorporating counterbalancing incentives in the code, making the payment
system incorruptible.

4.2.5

Consensus Mechanism at the Peer-to-Peer Network Level:
Coordinating Protocol Update

An important channel for code update is the BIP, a formal document used to propose
protocol changes. There are three kinds of BIP: a standard-track BIP that describes a
universal change to the protocol; an informational BIP that address a Bitcoin design
issue; and, a process BIP, which pertains to changes to procedures and decision-making
processes (Github BIPs, 2018). Appendix D lists all BIPs (including authors and status);
Appendix E shows a sample BIP (BIP #151), with its key components. The BIP structure
and process is not unlike the academic journal review process. New ideas and proposals
are discussed in the community or in focus groups in order to get feedback. Proposals are
then submitted to BIP editors, who can either reject or approve them. Approved proposals
are then moved to a repository and their status changed to “draft,” as indicated in Figure
1. The draft will not be finalized until the reference implementation is completed (e.g., in
the form of code). Each BIP follows a well-defined format and is reviewed in a
standardized process. However, the decision to adopt any proposed change is made by
the user at the client end.
While miners consent to playing by the rulebook, they can vote to change it using the
influence derived from their computing power. When it comes to solving related issues,
making changes to the code, or deciding which protocol to adopt with clients, decision
making is coordinated through consensus within and between stakeholder groups, as in
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OSSD. “Most of these processes actually happen a bit more fluid[ly] and more
casual[ly],” said Fabian Vogelsteller, EIP 12 developer (interview #27).
However, an important distinction between DAOs and OSSD projects is the use of
cryptocurrency tokens as an economic incentive. In contrast to OSSD contexts, Bitcoin
relies on a mixed community of volunteer developers and paid miners who jointly revise
the organizational design through BIPs. Put simply, Bitcoin offers a novel solution to
“the universal problems of organizing” (Puranam et al., 2014), by involving a new class
of stakeholders, incentivized by both machine routines and community discussions, and
through the design of an organization whose parameters cannot be changed unilaterally
by any stakeholder group and whose routine operations cannot be derailed by insiders’
covert misconduct.
As shown in Figure 4 in Chapter 2, a BIP draft can progress to various stages of approval,
e.g., deferred, proposed, rejected, withdrawn. What determines the acceptance of a
proposal? Andy Chase, a Bitcoin developer and BIP author explained:
Whether [a BIP] goes to final/active . . . depends on the BIP. Some BIPs are just .
. . standard, like the UI schemes so you can just switch it to final when you're
done making it. For active, it's just whether you were able to submit a change and
the vast majority of users are using the change. So if it's a fork . . . [with] a feature
change, then at least a certain number of users have to be using it. And then you
get to that point where it gets more complicated because if it's in Bitcoin Core 13
then . . . you have to figure out, in order for enough users to use it, you either have
to go through the Bitcoin Core process, which is like writ[ing] the code, get[ting]

12

EIP stands for Ethereum Improvement Proposal. It is a concept based on Bitcoin’s BIPs repository.
Similar to BIPs, EIP developers share protocol updates, discuss ideas and issues, and make a pull request as
an EIP document. Once the pull request is merged, one could say that it has been officially accepted by the
community. (Vogelsteller, interview # 27).
13

Bitcoin Core refers to the Bitcoin software protocol with all four functions: wallet, mining, blockchain,
and network routing. See also Figure 14 and Figure 15 in Appendix C.
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PR14 requests, which just like submitting code for review, getting it approved and
then waiting for the next version or . . . a convincing people to use your own
software (interview #28).
In general, acceptance depends on the nature of the protocol update, i.e., whether it is
contentious (e.g., changing blockchain consensus rules) or uncontentious (e.g., changing
software behavior decisions unrelated to blockchain consensus rules).
Generally, we don't end up adopting a proposal unless it has pretty much near
unanimous agreement whether it's a good idea. Now, this can vary somewhat in
the sense that ... if it's a blockchain consensus rule that would require a hard fork15
then, obviously it must be pretty much unanimous agreement that it's a good idea
because contentious hard forks tend to cause disasters as [the] kind of thing over
in Bitcoin. If it's something like either a soft fork to the consensus rules or
something that's not consensus critical . . . like a software behavior decision that
isn't specific blockchain consensus rules . . . we won't require quite as much
consensus. Generally, we try to avoid doing things that are particularly
contentious. [Jeremy Rand, Lead developer of Namecoin, interview #31]
While BIPs are intended to provide a formal structure to the proposal assessment process,
less formal means of communication are also used to help developers reach consensus.
Intriguingly, the threshold is usually so high that almost unanimous consensus is
expected.

14

PR stands for “pull requests”, which are a feature of code repositories such as GitHub, which allows
developers to push code changes, discuss, and review the proposed modifications and add follow-up
commits before the changes are merged into the repository (source: https://help.github.com/articles/aboutpull-requests/).
15

A hard fork refers to a protocol change in which the new version of the software is not backward
compatible. For blockchain DAOs, this creates a new blockchain that requires the entire network to update
their protocol to the new version in order to stay in the same DAO. Otherwise, a new blockchain will be
created as a result. For this reason, changes to consensus rules can only be achieved through hard forks.
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Part of the reason for this is that we generally recognize that we all kind of have
varying areas of specialty and as a result, we tend to have somewhat . . . varying
perspectives on how to solve the same problem. In our experience, it tends to be
more effective to actually discuss a problem . . . until we reach a near unanimous
consensus rather than to just do something like . . . a majority vote. Majority
votes simply don't work very well in a project like this, especially security critical
projects. Generally speaking, if there's a significant portion of the developer
community who are strongly against a particular change, then usually that's a sign
that there really is a problem with it and then it needs to be addressed in some
way.

[Jeremy Rand, interview #31]

For miners to signal support for a particular proposal, a threshold (e.g., 95 per cent of
network computing power) may be identified. According to Jonas Schnelli, developer
and BIP author, “In the past [the] threshold was [up] to 95 per cent of miners . . .
signaling readiness. And if the 95 per cent has been reached, the BIP or the change was
locked in16, so [it was] universally activated” (interview #21).

For the case of individual BIPs, Tanaka Khan, Bitcoin developer and BIP author
explained:
Usually, this means miners will code the blocks they find with a signal (version
bits) indicating their support. Basically, miners vote for particular changes to the
code by indicating their willingness to run that code. If the miner voting yields
above that threshold, then the code activates, and everyone must run it or be
forked off the main network (interview #25).
Following the example of BIPs, code development proposals for other DAOs have been
created. For example, Bitcoin Unlimited has its own version called “Bitcoin Unlimited

16

A BIP proposal being “locked in” refers to the status of a BIP being scheduled to activate at a certain
block height.
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Improvement Proposals” (BUIPs), Ethereum uses “Ethereum Improvement Proposals”
(EIPs), and Bitcoin has another proposal called “Bitcoin Enhancement Proposals”
(BEPs).
“Most minor code changes don’t require a BIP, and instead are merged into the main
code branch with pull requests on GitHub”, explained Khan (interview #25).
Alternatively, developers may use less formal online forums to communicate ideas to
different communities, e.g., “Bitcointalk” and “Bitcoin subreddit.” These are less
technical and oriented toward the broader community.

4.2.6

What happens when Consensus cannot be reached?

Consensus is vital for DAOs as it constitutes the core of decision making and change.
Consensus on the true state of the blockchain public ledger MUST be achieved—any
disagreement will result in the splitting of the network through hard forks.
[H]ard fork works like this: if you have . . . a network of 10 nodes and one node
updates and say from block 2,000 on, I will change the consensus rules. Then
from this block on, he will have a different hash in this block, so therefore his
blocks will look different than the rest of the network. He will split off even alone
. . . so if you have two of these 10 people, then these two split off, and 8 stay . . .
so there's no majority vote necessarily. [Fabian Volgelsteller, interview #27]
To give an example, Bitcoin Cash split from Bitcoin on August 1, 2017, over a
disagreement concerning the means required to improve Bitcoin’s transaction processing
speed. This is known as the scalability issue. Proposed solutions included implementing
SegWit 2X 17 (BIP #91) and increasing the Bitcoin block size limit to include more
transactions per block. While the first proposal received nearly 100 per cent support from

17

Segregated Witness (SegWit) is a solution to the scalability problem proposed in BIP#91 and,
subsequently, by BIP #141 via BIP #9 activation. SegWit proposes that Bitcoin transaction data be
segmented in two. By restructuring the data removing the unlocking signature ("witness" data) from the
original transaction data and appending it as a separate layer, a Bitcoin block will be able to almost double
its capacity. [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SegWit, accessed April 2018]
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Bitcoin miners (see Figure 10) and was scheduled for activation, those in favor of the
second proposal followed a hard fork (i.e., a new software version) and became Bitcoin
Cash, a separate DAO. Bitcoin Gold, meanwhile, was created as a result of another hard
fork on October 24, 2017, which involved an attempt to restore GPU mining 18, which had
been replaced by the expensive specialist mining hardware, ASIC19. By changing the
algorithm, a new DAO was created. As explained in the Bitcoin Gold (2017) white paper,
“[a] blockchain hard fork occurs when a block is mined that does not comply with the
network consensus rules” (Btcgpu.org).
Figure 10 Percentage of Blocks Signaling SegWit Support from Miners

To conclude, while disagreements in traditional organizations tend to be resolved through
social and political means, for DAOs like Bitcoin, dissension means “the split of the

18

GPU (or graphics processing unit) mining is a much more efficient way of mining Bitcoin using graphic
cards.
19

ASIC (application-specific integrated circuit) is mining hardware specifically designed for Bitcoin
mining. It is a circuit and not typically capable of general computing in the sense of a “computer”. ASIC is
computing-power intensive and a cause of concern for mining centralization.
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universe,” according to Nick Johnson, Ethereum Core Developer and EIP author.
“Basically, the hard fork is the upgrade process and, in many ways, similar to a regular
software upgrade process. But the difference [is] that everyone has to upgrade and
anyone who doesn't team up ends up with the version of the chain without the upgrade.
(interview # 26)
The split of universe resulting from disagreements can also mean organizational
innovation and change for DAOs.
I think one of the strength[s] [of] blockchains is the ability to split . . . [It] is a sign
as the health of the community is how well it's able to come to consensus . . .
When people really do have fundamental disagreements, they can resolve them by
going off on their own and starting their own system or continuing the old system
as the case may be . . . A sign of the health of the community is how well it's able
to come to consensus. So sometimes [there] will be irreconcilable differences, but
in a healthy community that happens as little as possible. [Nick Johnson,
Ethereum Core Developer and EIP author, interview #26]
Johnson added, “hard forks are pretty much the only way we can institute change, then
we can add new features and that we can change the system . . . soft forks are proven to
be effectively impossible and it also much more restrictive in terms of what they can
achieve” (interview #26).
In fact, some even consider forking as the only way a DAO like Bitcoin can
innovate: “We can replace the words ‘hard fork’ and ‘soft fork’ with ‘software upgrade.’
They're the only ways to innovate inside Bitcoin (or any other mined cryptocurrency),
and they're necessary when making changes that either aren't backwards compatible (hard
fork) or are (soft fork). [Tenaka Khan, Bitcoin developer and BIP author, interview #25]

4.2.7

Integrating Consensus at Varying Levels: the Organizational
Level

While task integration in traditional settings focuses on rules and processes designed, in
large part, by managers (Okhuysen & Bechky, 2009; Rivkin & Siggelkow, 2003; Stan &
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Puranam, 2016), Bitcoin network validation and protocol update tasks are integrated by
miners, a brand new class of paid stakeholders incentivized by cryptocurrency tokens.
An important defining feature of cryptocurrency is the economic value of the tokens used
to exchange value (Ryan Zurrer, Polychain Capital, interview #30). Given that
cryptocurrency tokens are also offered as an incentive to network validators, high
security requirements are fundamental. This can be achieved through the implementation
of the consensus protocol—the cryptocurrency network will have to be in complete
agreement to reach distributed consensus (Jeremy Rand, Namecoin Core Developer, 2018
Interview #31) The fact that token holders overlap with network validators and users
provides a mechanism by which distributed consensus may be integrated at varying
levels.

4.2.8

Decentralization is a Continuum

It is important to note that the decentralization of decision making at the organizational
level is relative. Recently, a decision was made by a small group of members to suspend
the scheduled implementation of SegWit 2X20.
Prior to [SegWit2X] cancelation, it had enough miner support to be activated.
Support obviously fell dramatically after the release was cancelled. ‘Lack of
consensus’ in this case basically means a perceived lack of consensus, without
any hard numbers to back it up ... There wasn’t much discussion on it and no
decisions were made through its BIP [#144]. [Tenaka Khan, Bitcoin developer
and BIP author, interview # 25]

20

The suspension was announced on November 8, 2017, in an email written by Mike Belshe, one of the
leaders of the SegWit2X project. He wrote: "Unfortunately, it is clear that we have not built sufficient
consensus for a clean block size upgrade at this time. Continuing on the current path could divide the
community and be a setback to Bitcoin’s growth. This was never the goal of SegWit2X…Until then, we are
suspending our plans for the upcoming 2MB upgrade." (https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoinsegwit2x/2017-November/000685.html, accessed December 2017)
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Although SegWit2X was supported by 95 per cent of the miners, it was canceled due to a
lack of consensus among the sponsors 21 and developers of the project. A concern about
the possibility of the highly contentious hard fork dividing the Bitcoin community and
fear of subsequent market destabilization were the main reasons behind the suspension.
Thus, miners, developers, and the rest of the network may not always arrive at the same
decision. The presence of centralized sponsors or foundations associated with a
cryptocurrency can mitigate the magnitude of decentralized decision making.
Decisions on code modification by developers and miners can diverge in similar ways:
[Y]ou could have all the miners wanting to double the mining reward and the . . .
software implementers (developers) would go, no, that’s a bad idea for the
network. We’d refuse. As long as you have a limited number of clients and a
limited number of people working on those, then there's going to be some degree
of centralization . . . On the other hand, if . . . you preach you really wanted [it]
and it was not a terrible idea they knew could drive it forward even if you are . . .
a complete outsider. So you propose an idea and if it seems like a good one and it
will get implemented. If it's like, well this is good, but low priority you could put
your own effort into implementing it yourself. And if you do the work you'll get
the feature pretty much because even though it seems like [a] good idea and
you've done for us. So great ([Nick Johnson, interview #26]
In the next chapter, I will examine more closely determinants of the degree of
decentralized decision making.

4.3

Conclusions from the Pilot Case Study

As a pilot study, this chapter drew on the example of Bitcoin in order to lay out a
foundational understanding of DAO coordination. My findings reveal the following
observations. First, separate levels define the two types of tasks performed by DAOs like

21

The SegWit2X project is sponsored by various industry start-ups, such as the enterprise blockchain
technology company Bloq, wallet providers Blockchain and BitGo, and mining hardware provider Bitmain.
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Bitcoin, namely, network validation and protocol update. Second, the two types of tasks
are coordinated by distributed consensus mechanisms and integrated through mining.
Third, consensus mechanisms need to be studied at the corresponding levels at which
tasks are performed—the blockchain and protocol levels versus the peer-to-peer network
level. Fourth, complex interactions exist between these levels and influence
organizational decision making. Finally, decentralization of strategic decision making at
the organizational level needs to be studied as a continuum. I will delve into these
concepts and examine their implications for growth in the following chapter.
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Chapter 5 Research Design

5

Research Design*

* This chapter draws heavily from the front end of my paper, “The Rise of Decentralized
Autonomous Organizations: New Forms of Task Coordination and the Growth of
Cryptocurrencies,” co-authored with Dr. Jean-Philippe Vergne. The paper is currently in the
first round of revision-and-resubmission (R&R) with Administrative Science Quarterly (ASQ).

Building on the Bitcoin pilot study discussed in Chapter 4, I will now examine a range of
blockchain-based cryptocurrency DAOs and perform a comparative study across multiple
cases. The goal of this chapter is to provide a fine-grained picture and generalizable
framework of how various coordination mechanisms work within DAOs, in order to
answer the central research question identified, namely:
How are DAOs coordinated to enable growth?
To answer this question, I conducted fsQCA following a three-stage design. The first
stage of the study extended the preliminary findings from the pilot study and identified
important features of task coordination within DAOs through 16 semi-structured
interviews with DAO founders and core developers, as well as through specialized
archival sources such as industry reports, expert blogs, and white papers. I also attended
11 industry conferences 22 to conduct field observations and informally engage with
insiders. I thickly described and elaborated upon concepts of consensus mechanisms at
the blockchain and protocol versus peer-to-peer network levels by reconnecting them to
recent theory that argues that coordination is about achieving accountability,
predictability, and common understanding (Okhuysen & Bechky, 2009).
In the second stage, based on these findings, I sampled 20 DAOs in the cryptocurrency
industry that differ in terms of how they coordinate such tasks as transaction verification,
maintenance of the public ledger, and the rewarding of internal stakeholders along the

22

My co-researcher attended some of these conferences to conduct separate observations.
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previously identified dimensions of consensus mechanisms at various levels and
decentralization of strategy making. I then conducted fsQCA using archival data to
understand which configurations of task coordination features foster DAO growth (or
decline).
Finally, in a third stage, I triangulated the fsQCA results and fleshed these out in light of
a second wave of interview data (n=10). Based on this inductive study, three propositions
were formulated to outline a theory of DAO coordination. Figure 11 outlines the threestage design.
Figure 11 The Three-Stage Research Design

5.1 Study Stage #1: How Are DAOs Coordinated?
5.1.1

Method

Building on the findings of the pilot study in Chapter 4, Stage #1 allowed me to
inductively obtain a deep understanding of how DAOs are coordinated by consensus
mechanisms. From multiple data sources, I identified key characteristics and
distinguishing features of DAO coordination. To begin, I reviewed: 15 cryptocurrency
white papers; over 150 industry reports, articles, and academic papers; and 10 books
authored by experts on Bitcoin, blockchain technology, and cryptocurrency. I also
reviewed the primary websites of 20 cryptocurrencies to delve into the technology, use
cases, and special features of each cryptocurrency. These technical, industry, and
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research documents laid the foundation for my understanding of how cryptocurrencies
work in general, and how they vary in terms of design and task coordination.
I then conducted 16 semi-structured interviews to delve further into DAO design and task
coordination. The interviewees included cryptocurrency founders who are also lead
developers, directors of cryptocurrency foundations, network validators, and blockchain
start-up founders in the FinTech industry. These are industry experts who have direct
experience in creating, developing, or managing DAOs in the cryptocurrency industry.
Each interview lasted 60 to 90 minutes. The questions asked focused on coordination and
decision making, as well as on the design philosophy and evaluation of cryptocurrencies.
In particular, I asked questions related to the origins, processes, and consequences of
different types of coordination among stakeholders (e.g., how algorithms affect the
DAO’s accountability vis-à-vis stakeholders; how developers and miners coordinate on
code modifications; how stakeholders make decisions and come to agreements; and, how
decentralization can be implemented).
Finally, my co-researcher and I participated in 11 cryptocurrency conferences and
workshops, during which I extensively observed and engaged with industry insiders in a
more informal manner. I tap into these data to provide a thick description of how DAOs
are coordinated.

5.1.2
5.1.2.1

Findings
Machine Consensus Based on Machine Routines at the
Blockchain and Protocol Levels

As noted in Chapter 4, at their core, DAOs rely on machine routines (as opposed to
human routines) (Antonopoulos, 2014) that are written in the blockchain, protocol, and
scripting code to coordinate network validation tasks. For instance, Bitcoin’s blockchain
software entails a set of routines governing the “competitive bookkeeping” process,
known as “mining” (Yermack, 2017: 13). In this process, voluntary network validators
(“miners”) try to guess a very long random number to provide a PoW to the system and
obtain the chance to earn a reward in the form of Bitcoin currency (Nian & Lee, 2015: 8).
Proof-of-work mining is not dissimilar to gold mining, in that it resembles the process of
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“gold miners expending resources to add gold to circulation”—except that for mining
bitcoins, they expend computing power to validate user transactions and record them in
the ledger (Nakamoto, 2008: 4). Machine routines also require that, at any point in time,
the true ledger must be the one containing the largest amount of “proven work” (in the
form of previously expended computing power).
As a result, the Bitcoin DAO makes it much more expensive for potentially malicious
users to tamper with the blockchain history (e.g., by adding 1,000 units of Bitcoin
currency to their account) than to play by the rules. A past block cannot be edited without
redoing all of the PoW leading up to the current one—a process that would not go
unnoticed and that would be prohibitively expensive in terms of hardware and electricity.
Thus, when it comes to processing, validating, and recording user transactions in a secure
way, “any needed rules and incentives can be enforced with this consensus mechanism”
that tells network validators what the true state of the ledger is (Nakamoto, 2008: 8).
Following industry experts, I call this set of automated coordination mechanisms based
on machine routines machine consensus mechanisms, defined as self-executing formal
software protocols that define and implement rules, routines, and incentives for
organizational participants to follow (Lopp, 2016; BlockchainHub.net, 2017). Machine
consensus, for instance, makes it unnecessary to coordinate teams of employees whose
primary task is the manual reconciliation of transaction balances that do not match across
ledgers maintained by different financial institutions.
I will now discuss two core dimensions of machine consensus along which DAOs in the
cryptocurrency industry can differ substantially. Based on interview data and documents,
I identified security and stability mechanisms as the foundational elements that support
the exchange of value in a peer-to-peer, open network that does not rely on trusted
intermediaries or personal identity. Subsequent investigation of these dimensions allowed
me to capture variation in machine consensus across the DAOs in our fsQCA analysis.
Machine Consensus #1: Providing security. A common feature across DAOs in the
cryptocurrency industry is the provision of a peer-to-peer, decentralized, open payment
system powered by cryptocurrency tokens which reward miners for their work. Since
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financial transactions are involved, to operate effectively DAOs must ensure that
cybersecurity is maximal and that record immutability is guaranteed—otherwise users
will simply look for alternatives. Two broad categories of machine consensus
mechanisms are implemented to coordinate security provision. As Jackson Palmer, cofounder and lead developer of Dogecoin (interview #9), explains,
The number one thing you want to look at with any DAO is how it secures the
network. The network ultimately has to be secured through proof of something.
Earlier coins had [PoW] via mining, which [relies on] intense computing. Some
coins moved to [PoS] … Obviously the people that carry the greatest consensus in
the network are those who own the highest stake.
In contrast to PoW, PoS consumes little external energy, and correlates the probability of
a network validator’s being chosen to validate the next block with the amount (and
sometimes age) of the cryptocurrency that the validator holds (Narayanan et al., 2016:
40-45; 206-211). As Douglas Pike, core developer and co-founder of Vericoin puts it,
A lot of [PoS network security] depends on the value of the coin. If the coin has a
very high value. [. . .] it is much more secure because it’s more costly to gain
majority control of the network [. . . ] In both cases, the consensus is protected by
cost, and it greatly depends on the value of the coin in [PoS], and greatly depends
on the difficulty level in [PoW] mining (interview # 12).
Although industry insiders hold different views on the effectiveness of PoW as opposed
to PoS, the general belief is that expending external resources (electricity or capital) is
necessary to coordinate security provision because it anchors the network to exogenous
factors that insiders cannot control.
Machine consensus #2: Ensuring stability. Since DAOs in the cryptocurrency industry
are open organizations that anybody can join and leave at will (network validators
included), characteristics such as network size or transaction validation speed change
constantly, thereby affecting how quickly transactions are processed. Indeed,
“decentralized things are hard to stabilize, just by the fact that they’re decentralized”
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(Patrick Noskar, founder of Vericoin, interview #6, 2016). Thus, to remain stable, DAOs
must have the capacity to adjust autonomously to a changing landscape.
Bitcoin does this by automatically adjusting mining difficulty (i.e., the difficulty of
guessing the random numbers) every 14 days to reset the target of an average transactionprocessing time of ten minutes. As the mining difficulty increases, “the coin distribution .
. . mimics the distribution pattern of a precious metal . . . As you dig up more and more, it
becomes more scarce,” according to Palmer (interview #9). The machine routines in
charge of adjusting mining difficulty also stabilize the speed of new coin issuance (i.e.,
inflation) by taking into account factors such as the overall network’s computing power,
the size of miners’ rewards, and transaction-processing times.
These dynamic adjustments, governed by publicly auditable algorithms, determine the
stability of rewards earned by network validators. While more frequent adjustments can
jeopardize validators’ ability to earn cryptocurrency rewards, they also make DAOs more
responsive to shocks in their environment. Thus, they play an important role in balancing
efficiency (resource allocation) and effectiveness (maintaining fit between the internal
and external environments to achieve the DAO’s high-level goals).

5.1.2.2

Social Consensus Mechanisms based on Multi-Stakeholder
Consultations at the Peer-to-Peer Network Level

As noted in Chapter 4, another key layer of task coordination pertains to protocol update
at the peer-to-peer network level. Lopp (2016) points out that “humans must first decide
what protocol to run before the machines can enforce it.” In line with industry experts, I
define social consensus mechanisms as the means by which DAO stakeholders reach an
agreement about the higher-level DAO protocol (which acts as a strategic plan for the
organization) (Buterin, 2014; Lopp, 2016). DAO software is open source and thus fully
disclosed for auditing, testing, and improvement purposes; as a consequence, the multistakeholder consultation around DAOs is coordinated in ways comparable to those which
characterize OSSD projects (O’Mahony & Lakhani, 2011).
In order to fix bugs, to implement new code, or to release a new version of the software
(a “fork”), DAOs rely on formal and informal community voting processes. For example,
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Bitcoin uses BIPs to discuss and align developers’ and miners’ expectations. A BIP
serves as a formalized technical design document that proposes new features or
documents decisions (GitHub BIPs, 2018). As noted in Chapter 4, coordination around
BIPs involves developers proposing code modifications that miners vote on by adding a
record of their decision into the blockchain. While the BIP author defines the threshold,
the rule of thumb suggests that a majority vote in favor of the proposal, representing at
least 55 per cent of the DAO’s computing power, leads to the adoption of the proposal.
When network validators, representing 95 per cent of the DAO’s computing power, have
implemented the software update, the proposal is considered “activated.” Any developer
can propose a new BIP, and anyone can become a Bitcoin developer. Note, however, that
not all DAOs in the cryptocurrency industry have formal voting mechanisms such as
BIPs. In some cases, developers rely on informal communication channels such as
forums to discuss protocol changes with the community. Unless a majority of network
validators is willing to implement the change by updating their software, however,
proposals for protocol change are bound to remain at the draft stage.
I will now discuss two core dimensions of social consensus over which DAOs in the
cryptocurrency industry tend to differ substantially. An examination of these dimensions
subsequently allowed us to capture variations in social consensus mechanisms across
DAOs in the fsQCA analyses.
Stakeholder discussions. The role of social consensus mechanisms is to facilitate
agreement within and between developers and miners, and amongst the broader
community (e.g., users and merchants who accept the cryptocurrency as payments).
Developers play a key role in the community and are trusted by its members in terms of
their capabilities to drive and implement code modifications (Narayanan et al., 2016).
Without substantial and frequent developer contributions, DAO development may,
according to James Lovejoy, core developer of Verticoin, become “hemorrhaged”
(interview #5). Looking back at the challenges he faced as a developer, Lovejoy
remarked: “If you want the coin to grow and expand . . . active development is probably
one of the more important things . . . There are a number of ideas of things people wanted
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to develop. It really required a lot more time and thought than people had available or
were willing to give” (interview #5).
While it is important that numerous developers contribute to stakeholder
discussions so that a DAO can gain exposure to a variety of new and innovative ideas, it
is even more crucial for the community to be mature enough to converge on a subset of
these ideas and to move on to implement them. An important indicator of the
community’s ability and willingness to do so is reflected in their code development
activities on the repository. According to David Cohen, executive and business
development director at the Blackcoin Foundation, “people will go to look at the GitHub
and see how frequently commits are being made to the code, so you see that there's . . .
active development and meaningful . . . ongoing work being done. That creates trust”
(David Cohen, interview #7).
Validators’ commitment. Network validators signal their commitment to a DAO by
devoting computing power to its blockchain. Without their continued support, a DAO
cannot evolve and is bound to fail due to questionable security (e.g., bugs are not fixed)
or competition (e.g., competitors improve their operations at a faster pace to leverage
network effects). As Cassini (pseudonym of a miner, interview #16) explains, “usually,
it’s the developers who make proposals or decisions. But in the end, it boils down to the
miners. If they don’t follow the ideas of the developers, then they turn to other ventures.”
In other words, validators’ commitment to the project is essential if social consensus at
the organizational level is to be reached; this represents a major difference between
DAOs and OSSD projects (which do not rely on network validators). Jeremy Rand, the
core developer of Namecoin (interview #15), recalled how Namecoin developers tried to
obtain validators’ consent to activate a software upgrade proposed in BIP#66 to solve a
vulnerability issue. 23

23

Namecoin closely follows Bitcoin’s development proposal, since Namecoin is built on the Bitcoin
source code and can be mined using the same hardware (i.e., “merge mined” alongside Bitcoin).
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We haven’t yet activated BIP66 [. . .], so we’re vulnerable. And so we
immediately contacted all of the mining pools and said, hey, you need to upgrade
to the latest version ASAP. And most of the mining pools were fairly quick to
respond. But we were not able to quickly contact sufficient hash power to reach
the 95 per cent threshold that’s needed to activate a soft fork, so we were hovering
around 92 per cent [. . .] After about a week or so, we were still having no luck
reaching the last seven or eight percent of hash power, and finally [. . .] F2Pool
contacted us [. . .] [with] enough hash power [. . . ] We can activate that soft fork
right now without waiting for the other miners to do their thing.
It follows that machine consensus and social consensus occur at different but overlapping
timescales. On the one hand, each entry on the blockchain ledger is an instantiation of
machine consensus and only protocol updates (e.g., changes proposed through BIPs)
require social consensus; on the other hand, validators’ commitment (as one dimension of
social consensus) is required for both payment validation and protocol update, thus plays
a dual role concurrently in integrating the two tasks. It should also be noted that network
validators form a new class of stakeholders that has never existed before, either in
traditional corporations or in distributed organizations such as OSSD projects.

5.1.2.3

Decentralization of Strategy Making

The origins of DAOs may be traced to the desire to remove the need for central authority.
At the organizational level, both machine consensus and social consensus mechanisms
operate in a decentralized fashion. However, certain organizational design elements
create variation in the extent to which strategy making is decentralized. Thus, while
traditional corporations typically rely on hierarchy to coordinate high-level activities,
DAOs rely on decentralized strategy making. However, as noted in Chapter 4,
decentralization is best seen as a continuum insofar as a DAOs’ coordination structure
revolves around an “uneasy but inevitable and necessary alliance of decentralization with
centralization” (Cohen, interview #7). Cohen uses Ethereum as an example:
On the one hand, [Ethereum] to a great extent has been incredibly successful at
offering a very decentralized approach. But there is the Ethereum Foundation,
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there are known personalities, Vitalik Buterin and Vlad Zamfir and so forth, who
are out there and . . .the respect that they've garnered, you know, for their
judgement and intelligence carries a lot of weight and is very helpful in reassuring
mainstream institutional players that this is not just a bunch of crazy geeks
operating in some haphazard way . . . So in that sense you have centralization
within decentralization.
Specific coordination mechanisms within particular DAOs can mitigate the extent to
which they are decentralized in the following ways. First, some DAOs have active
foundations—typically, not-for-profit organizations composed of developers, managers,
and community members serving on a voluntary basis. The goals of DAO foundations
include user education, adoption by merchants, business development, expansion of the
user base, branding, and strategic actions such as political lobbying (Andrew Vegetabile,
director of the Litecoin Association, interview #4, 2016). Additionally, an important role
of the foundation is to establish trust with the community:
[The foundation] was an attempt to bring legitimacy and human faces . . . How
can you trust a coin where you don't know who any of these people are, like, who
could disappear or do anything at any time, and that's not a very friendly and
transparent impression it makes on the public. [David Cohen, executive and
business development director at the Blackcoin Foundation, interview #7]
While foundations remain independent of cryptocurrency founders and core developers to
avoid conflicts of interest, there is a constant dialogue between the two sides. This serves
to to align interests, limiting the extent to which a DAO is decentralized when it comes to
strategic decision making (interview #7, 2016).
Second, for some DAOs (e.g., Bitcoin and Peercoin), the real-world identity of the cofounder(s) is unknown, which removes any association between the DAO and a
leadership figure that can be consulted for strategic direction. Thus, DAOs with
anonymous or pseudonymous co-founders (e.g., Bitcoin) tend to be more decentralized
and autonomous.
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Third, DAOs can have various design philosophies, ranging from the promotion of
distributed social innovation (e.g., Namecoin, Dogecoin, Peercoin) to business
development (e.g., Dash, Ethereum). A business-oriented development philosophy, for
instance, entails the creation of specific positions and roles aimed at growing the user
network to secure a competitive advantage in the cryptocurrency industry. By contrast,
DAOs with an innovation-oriented philosophy leverage decentralization for the greater
good, with minimal centralized control (Patrick Noskar, founder of Vericoin, interview
#6, 2016; Sunny King, co-founder of Peercoin, interview #3, 2016). For example, while
expressing his lack of interest in adopting a “mainstream business model” by providing
Namecoin domain names through a central server, Daniel Kraft, lead developer of
Namecoin (interview #8, 2016), stated: “We don’t want to endorse such a system, even if
it could simplify and bring users [together] ... I think that the philosophy of not just me
but also other main contributors in the community is that we don’t want that. We want to
really be decentralized.”
As a result, while decentralization represents the formative logic of DAOs in the
cryptocurrency industry, the degree of decentralization at the organizational level tends to
vary. Figure 5.2 summarizes our discussion thus far and provides an example of how task
coordination differs between DAOs and traditional corporations.
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Figure 12 Task coordination within Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAOs)
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5.2
Study Stage #2: The Growth Implications of Task
Coordination Patterns
5.2.1

Method: Fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA)

Building on my findings from Stage #1, Stage #2 examines the interplay between various
forms of consensus mechanisms managed under different degrees of decentralization of
strategy making and explores how they jointly explain DAO growth (or decline). For
emerging complex social phenomena, relationships between constructs are often “better
understood in terms of set-theoretic relations rather than correlations” (Fiss, 2011: 395;
Ragin, 2008: 2; Schneider & Wagemann, 2012: 1–3). A set-theoretic approach is both a
methodological and an analytical tool that identifies which configurations of conditions
are necessary or sufficient to obtain an outcome (Ragin & Fiss, 2008: 190). A necessary
condition is one that must be present for the outcome to take place. In other words,
without the necessary condition, it is impossible to obtain the outcome. A sufficient
condition is a one that produces the outcome. FsQCA has the ability to disentangle the
complexity underpinning poorly theorized social phenomena, especially when they
involve “equifinality, conjunctural causation, and causal asymmetry” (Ragin, 2008; Fiss,
2011; Schneider & Wagemann, 2012) 24. This methodology has been increasingly used in
recent management research to explain outcomes of strategic importance, e.g., firm
adaptation (Vergne & Depeyre, 2016), organizational typologies (Fiss, 2011), and
decoupling (Crilly, Zollo & Hansen, 2012). In the context of this study, fsQCA helps to
connect the various configurations of coordination mechanisms observed at various levels
and decentralization with the growth (or decline) of DAOs in the cryptocurrency
industry.

24

Equifinality arises in situations in which the same outcome can be produced by different configurations
of conditions, a situation commonly observed in organizational design research (Gresov & Drazin, 1997;
Puranam et al., 2014). Conjunctural causation refers to the idea that outcomes are rarely the product of
single conditions taken independently, but, rather, are produced by configurations involving multiple
conditions. Causal asymmetry is the idea that the conditions leading to the presence of an outcome differ
from those leading to the absence of the outcome (Fiss, 2011; Schneider & Wagemann, 2012: 78,198), i.e.,
DAO growth and decline may be underpinned by different factors.
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5.2.1.1

Organizational Configurations

Methodologically, configurations have been identified as a useful approach to study
organizational designs as clusters of attributes (such as ideal types and typologies) (Miles
& Snow, 1978; Mintzberg, 1979; Puranam et al., 2014; Doty, et al., 1993; Fiss, 2007;
Meyer, Tsui & Hinings, 1993). A configurational approach is appropriate to the study of
within-form variations, because it unpacks how organizations of the same form can be
configured differently to achieve growth (Puranam et al., 2014). Different structural
configurations can be equally effective, thus leading to the aforementioned idea of
equifinality (Gresov & Drazin, 1997; Puranam et al., 2014). Okhuysen & Bechky (2009)
note that those integrating conditions for coordination—accountability, predictability, and
common understanding are “necessary but not always sufficient” for coordination. In
addition, the relationships between the three conditions are highly context specific. They
can coexist, work as complements, or work as substitutes together (Okhuysen & Bechky,
2009). A hypothesis-testing approach will not be appropriate for capturing this
complexity. These limitations further reinforce the validity of using fsQCA to study
coordination mechanisms as configurations.

5.2.1.2

Sampling Strategy

I selected 20 cryptocurrencies founded between 2009, when Bitcoin was first introduced,
and early 2015, when we started to collect data. The sampling is stratified by period. My
dataset includes: one cryptocurrency founded before 2010 (Bitcoin); three founded
between 2011 and 2013, when the industry was still in its infancy and had not achieved
mainstream public visibility; seven founded in 2013, when the industry underwent a
period of steep growth; eight founded in 2014; and one founded in early 2015. For each
period, I randomly selected a number of cryptocurrencies in proportion to the prevailing
founding rate in the industry in order to obtain a balanced and representative sample. I
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selected cryptocurrencies within the top 200 in terms of market capitalization, which
together account for over 99 per cent of the industry’s total value.

25

The sampled cryptocurrencies vary in terms of their coordination mechanisms. For
example, 13 use PoW as their primary consensus algorithm, five use PoS, and two are
hybrids (i.e., they use both PoW and PoS). The 20 cryptocurrencies also vary in terms of
their degree of decentralization. As of May 2017, the 20 cryptocurrencies sampled
accounted for about 70 per cent of the industry’s total market capitalization.

5.2.1.3

Overview of the Data and Conditions Included in the fsQCA
Analyses

I chose to study growth in the first two quarters that followed each cryptocurrency’s
founding. This choice was motivated by two reasons. First, most failed cryptocurrencies
disappear within six months, so this time frame appears to be a critical threshold a fact
confirmed by. In fact, industry insiders confirmed that the first two quarters were crucial.
One interviewee, Douglas Pike, stated, “I would say if you’re not meeting your goals
within three to six months, you’re not going to get them.” (interview #12) Second, while
comparing DAOs founded at different times allowed me to examine a representative
sample of the cryptocurrency industry’s early years, it also came a drawback, given that I
was not studying a cohort. This meant that, at any given point in time, the sampled
cryptocurrencies were in different stages of their idiosyncratic trajectories (i.e., they were
not the same “age”). Thus, II remedied this potential issue by examining them all during
the first six months of their existence, thereby making them comparable.
I collected longitudinal archival data on market transactions, network validation,
and developer activity from leading specialist websites, code repositories, and executive

25

The sample includes cryptocurrencies that are currently active (e.g., Bitcoin, Litecoin, Dogecoin), ones
that are declining (e.g., Zetacoin, Megacoin), and those that became inactive over time (e.g., Paycoin,
XCurrency). During the observation period, three cryptocurrencies fell outside of the top 200, so our
sample contains a balanced set of cases with substantial variance in terms of growth. Following prior
research (Wang & Vergne, 2017, Ong, Lee, Li, & Lee, 2015: 85), I excluded cryptocurrencies that were
obvious scams from the sampling pool.
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interviews.26 I also obtained blockchain-level data from technical documents such as
cryptocurrency white papers. I coded variations of each sampled DAO’s design based on
our qualitative interviews with co-founders and lead developers.
Building on the results of the first stage of the study, I developed and calibrated an
indicator for DAO growth and indicators for each of the three sets of coordination
mechanisms identified. In line with my findings, I captured machine consensus
mechanisms using two indicators: security provision and stability provision. I captured
social consensus mechanisms using two indicators of the depth and breadth of
stakeholder discussions, and one indicator of validators’ commitment. Finally, I created a
tridimensional indicator of the decentralization of strategy making, which takes into
account such factors as: the design philosophy of the DAO; whether its co-founders are
known; and, whether it works with a foundation.

5.2.1.4

Outcome Calibration: DAO Growth (and Decline)

For DAOs, attracting new users rapidly is vital for generating positive network effects to
kick-start organizational growth (e.g., the more users a DAO has, the more secure its
network becomes, and the more attractive it becomes to new users) (Gandal &
Halaburda, 2016). Users drive up demand for a cryptocurrency by conducting
transactions (Narayanan et al., 2016: 171–173; Ong et al., 2015: 82–90). As Pike
explained,
The goal is at some point you break into an actual currency closed loop where [. .
.] people get their currency, and then they buy something with it, and then that
merchant [. . .] buys something with it, and then [. . .] you’ve created a new
currency in a full loop. [. . . ] It’s very hard to get to that point, but that’s the end
goal. [. . .] Once the coin is released, most of the development and feature releases
also occur and those typically happen within, you know, six months. There is this

26

Web data sources include: https://bitinfocharts.com; https://coingecko.com/;
www.coinwarz.com/cryptocurrency; coinmarketcap.com; and, https://github.com. Various academic papers
and book chapters have used CoinGecko’s data to compare cryptocurrencies (e.g., Ong et al., 2015).
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new shiny object dynamic [. . .] [serving as] an opportunity [for cryptocurrencies]
to gain value, gain users, to reach more people when you’re new and you’re shiny.
And then once that wears off it’s much more difficult to meet your goals
(interview #12).
I calculated DAO growth based on the number of user transactions that took place
during the first two quarters after the founding of the DAO. I measured DAO growth by
looking at transaction growth between the first and second quarters (Q1 and Q2
respectively) of the cryptocurrency’s existence:
𝐷𝐴𝑂 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ (𝑜𝑟 𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒) =
Average number of unique transactions per day in Q2−Average number of unique transactions per day in Q1
Average number of unique transactions per day in Q1

A positive sign indicates growth. A negative sign indicates decline. In terms of the
fsQCA calibration, the crossover point for growth and decline is clear cut: I set the
calibrated condition to 0.5 for growth rates equal to 0. A twofold increase in transactions
can be considered fast growth that outperforms that of most newly created
cryptocurrencies, so to growth rates greater than 100 per cent, I allocated a score of 1. I
allocated a score of 0 when the rate of decrease was 100 per cent.

5.2.1.5

Explanatory Conditions

I calibrated all explanatory conditions using Q1 data to explain growth outcomes from
Q1 to Q2 in order to account for the lagged effect of coordination on growth and to
enhance explanatory power. The paragraphs that follow outline my calibration strategy
for each explanatory condition; related technical details about measurement can be found
in Appendix F.
Machine consensus mechanisms
Security provision. Within DAOs, cryptographic proof is supposed to rely mostly on
external resources to provide security. Proof-of-work mining’s external resource
requirements in the form of electricity help DAOs achieve higher security and reliability
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by increasing the cost of attacking the network or of tampering with the records stored in
the ledger. The more secure the DAO’s network, the more predictable organizational task
coordination will be. On the other hand, because PoS algorithms rely primarily on capital
internalized within the DAO (i.e., existing cryptocurrency holdings), they offer an
alternative that is more energy efficient but potentially less secure (i.e., insiders might be
able to influence cryptocurrency prices but not electricity prices). To capture the
difference, I coded the extent to which a DAO uses PoW. A cryptocurrency relying more
on PoW was assigned a score above 0.5: a cryptocurrency relying more on PoS was
assigned a score below 0.5.
Stability provision. As noted earlier, machine consensus algorithms adjust themselves
regularly to adapt to changing conditions in the environment (e.g., variations in
transaction-processing speed). The key variable here is the extent to which the difficulty
level set for network validators (e.g., miners) fluctuates. More fluctuation makes a DAO
more responsive to shocks in its environment (thereby enhancing stability and
effectiveness), but it can jeopardize network validators’ ability to earn cryptocurrency
rewards (thereby potentially creating inefficiencies in resource allocation). Using data
from Coinwarz.com on difficulty fluctuation over 14-day periods, I calibrated the 0.5
anchor based on the median variance of normalized bi-weekly difficulty values in Q1.
Scores greater (lower) than 0.5 indicate higher (lower) levels of stability provision.
Social consensus mechanisms
The OSSD literature examines developers’ engagement and efforts in relation to
subprojects to capture coordination at the individual level (Dahlander & O’Mahony,
2011). Building on this insight, and in line with our earlier findings, to capture social
consensus in a DAO context, I aggregated developers’ and network validators’ activities
to capture the breadth and depth of stakeholder discussions as well as network validators’
commitment to the organization.
Breadth of stakeholder discussions. I measured the breadth of stakeholder discussions by
calculating the average number of unique contributors to the code based on each
cryptocurrency’s open-source code repository on GitHub.com—the largest and most
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commonly used platform for cryptocurrency software-development projects. Contributors
can “commit” (i.e., make changes) or propose additions and deletions to the code. The
median number of contributors—20—was used to set the 0.5 anchor. Scores above 0.5
indicate a broader involvement of contributors in stakeholder discussions.
Depth of stakeholder discussions. I measured the depth of stakeholder discussions by
calculating the average number of additions and deletions to the cryptocurrency source
code on GitHub. Each of these contributions is typically discussed informally by the
broader community in online forums such as Reddit. I used GitHub records to proxy their
depth, because such records represent an objective and exhaustive list of discussion
topics (i.e., each code modification is time stamped and clearly associated with one
specific DAO). I set the 0.5 anchor at the median—30,000. Scores above 0.5 indicate a
deeper involvement of contributors in stakeholder discussions.
Validator’s commitment. As previously noted, network validators signal their
commitment to a DAO by devoting computing power to its blockchain. This commitment
is essential to coordinate a variety of tasks, e.g., voting on proposed changes or activating
a new software update after reaching a wide consensus. An indicator known as the
“network hash rate” is readily available on bitinfocharts.com to measure the computing
power committed by each DAO’s network validators. It refers to the total number of
calculations per second made by network validators. A higher hash rate implies greater
commitment by network validators, who, it should be recalled, can choose to opt out
anytime and instead commit their computing power to a competing DAO. I set the 0.5
anchor at the median value of the network hash rate—109 hashes per second. Scores
above 0.5 indicate a stronger commitment of network validators to a given DAO.
Decentralization of strategy making
As our findings from this study’s first stage indicate, DAOs that are overseen by
foundations, that have publicly known (co-)founders, or that have a business-oriented
design philosophy tend to be less decentralized. I collected data from interviews,
cryptocurrency websites, and online forums on these three dimensions separately and
then combined them (Crilly et al., 2012) to calibrate our indicator of centralization of
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strategy making. The least decentralized DAOs are coded as 1 (and possess all three
features), while the most decentralized DAOs are coded as 0.

5.2.2

FsQCA findings: Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for
Growth and Decline

Out of 20 cryptocurrencies, seven experienced growth and 13 decline in the first six
months of their respective existences. The fully calibrated dataset is shown in Table 4
below to enable reproducibility of the findings (Bergh, Sharp, Aguinis & Li, 2017). I ran
all analyses with the freeware fsQCA 2.5 software package (Ragin & Davey, 2014).
Table 4 Fs-QCA Calibration Table
DAO

Security
provision

Stability
provision

Breadth of
stakeholder
discussions

Depth of
stakeholder
discussions

Validators’
commitment

Decentrali
zation

Transaction
growth
(or
decline)

Bitcoin
Ethereum
Litecoin
Paycoin
Dogecoin
Peercoin
Namecoin
Blackcoin
Novacoin
Vericoin
Vertcoin
Reddcoin
Zetacoin
Dashcoin
Worldcoin
Feathercoin
Quarkcoin
Megacoin
Auroracoin
XCurrency

1
0.8
0.8
0
0.8
0.4
1
0.2
0.4
0.2
0.8
0.2
1
0.8
0.8

0
0.33
0.66
0
0.66
1
0.66
0
0.66
0
0.66
0.33
0.33
0.33
0.33

0.2
0.6
0.6
0.4
1
0.2
1
0.4
0.2
0
1
1
0.8
1
0.6

0.6
1
0.6
0.2
1
0
0.6
1
0.6
0
0.4
1
0.4
0.8
0.2

0
0.4
0.2
1
0.8
0.8
0.8
0.4
0.4
0.4
0.6
0.6
1
0.6
0.4

0.66
0.33
0.33
0.66
0.33
1
0.66
0.33
0.49
0.33
0.49
0.66
0.66
0
0.33

0.4
0.8
0.2
0.4
0.2
0.4
0.4
0.6
0.4
0.4
0.4
0.4
0.49
0.6
0.49

0.8
0.8
0.8
0.8
0.2

0.66
0.66
0.66
0.33
0

0.8
0.2
0
0.2
0

0.6
0.2
0
0.8
0

0.6
0.4
0.4
0.6
0.6

0.49
1
0.66
0
0.33

0.4
1
0.8
0.2
0.4

I ran four rounds of fsQCA analyses to identify necessary and sufficient conditions for
both DAO growth and DAO decline. Each round of analysis yielded consistency and
coverage scores that indicate the reliability of the results. More specifically, “consistency
indicates the extent to which [DAOs] with high membership in a given solution set
exhibit similar properties (i.e., consistency can be seen as a measure of a solution’s
internal validity)”; “coverage indicates the proportion of . . . outcomes explained by a
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given solution set (e.g., a coverage score of 1 would mean the solution explains all the
cases” (Vergne & Depeyre, 2016: 11). In line with best practices, I used high thresholds
for both reliability and proportional reduction in inconsistency (PRI) scores when
searching for necessary and sufficient conditions (Ragin, 2008). Specifically, I used a
0.90 cutoff in consistency for all conditions, and PRI thresholds of 0.74 and 0.64 for
sufficient conditions leading to growth and decline, respectively. No truth table row
contains true logical contradictions, and I did not make any directional assumptions in the
logical-minimization procedure, in line with the fact that there was no prior theory on
DAOs available to guide our analyses.
I will discuss the configurations identified at this stage in Chapter 6.

5.3
Study Stage #3: Triangulation and Proposition
Formation
Given the novelty of the DAO phenomenon and the fact that the present study is the first
one to investigate coordination in this context, I felt that it was important to go back into
the field and conduct a second wave of 10 interviews to triangulate and flesh out some of
the findings from studies #1 and #2. For this reason, four of the interviews conducted
during this second wave are follow-ups with respondents previously interviewed during
study stage #1. These interviews shed additional light on the interpretation of the fsQCA
results.
I will discuss the three propositions formulated at this stage in Chapter 6.
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Chapter 6 Results

6

Results*

* This chapter draws heavily from the results section of my paper, “The Rise of
Decentralized Autonomous Organizations: New Forms of Task Coordination and the
Growth of Cryptocurrencies,” co-authored with Dr. Jean-Philippe Vergne. The paper is
currently in the first round of revision-and-resubmission (R&R) with Administrative
Science Quarterly (ASQ).
In this chapter, I discuss the results of the fsQCA analyses detailed in Chapter 5. As is
often the case, I did not find any necessary conditions with an acceptable consistency
score—the solutions yielded scores between 0.53 and 0.83, all falling short of the 0.90
threshold. This simply means that there is no single “recipe” that must be followed every
time to produce growth (or decline). I did, however, identify sufficient configurations of
coordination mechanisms leading to DAO growth and decline. Sufficient conditions
represent alternative paths that produce the same outcome.
For the sake of conciseness, and in keeping with the exploratory character of the present
study, Table 5 below depicts configurations with high explanatory power and in which I
have high confidence. I thus report the so-called “parsimonious solution,” which
“contains only core conditions that have the strongest evidence linking them to the
outcomes” (Crilly et al., 2012: 1439; Fiss, 2011) and is independent of the researcher’s
assumptions about the phenomenon. 27

27

For similar reasons, the table does not report two configurations with low explanatory power (e.g., low
unique coverage); the configuration “contains” only one cryptocurrency, thereby raising doubts about its
generalizability. Blackcoin (growth) and Auroracoin (decline), two small DAOs in the industry, are thus
not mentioned in the table, but the full results can be reproduced from Table 4 or provided by the authors
upon request. To obtain growth configurations, I selected the minimum number of “prime implicants”
required by the software (2) to proceed with the logical minimization—specifically, I chose ~stability
breadth depth ~decentralization and security stability ~depth decentralization since they represent
theoretically relevant cases observed frequently in our data.
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Table 5 Configurations for Early Transaction Growth and Decline

●: Condition is present; ⊗: Condition is absent; *: non-exhaustive list

6.1
Configurations of Coordination Mechanisms
Sufficient for DAO Growth (G1 and G2)
Overall, either a strong use of machine consensus mechanisms combined with
decentralization of strategy making (G1) or a strong use of social consensus mechanisms
(G2) needs to be present for DAO growth in the cryptocurrency industry. Quarkcoin and
Megacoin, which can both be found in G1, kicked off growth by relying on strong
machine consensus. Founded around the same time in 2013, the two cryptocurrencies
have a good deal in common. Both are strongly committed to the value of
decentralization, and in line with this claim, both have pseudonymous co-founders and
are not overseen by foundations. In addition, both DAOs refused to “pre-mine”
cryptocurrency, that is, to distribute tokens to core developers and co-founders before the
official launch date. As Sunny King (pseudonym of Peercoin’s co-founder) explains: “It
was generally regarded as shady if you ‘pre-mined’ a bunch of coins” (interview #3)

83

because it gave some insiders an unfair advantage over other users. Pre-mining, though,
can be used successfully to lubricate social relationships by creating a common pool of
resources shared by a small circle of innovators who know each other and guide
organizational development.
This is precisely what happened with Ethereum (G2), one of the most successful DAOs
to date. Pre-mining can incentivize developers to drive the success of software
development by providing them with a (future and uncertain) source of income. A
community member stated that, “it is similar to start-up founders, where the founding
team has a certain amount of equity, and investors come in only to take a part of it. It is
not in the interests of investors to leave the founders with nothing” (Ethereum
Community Forum, 2014). More generally, G2 describes a path to growth that relies on
strong social consensus. This is not to say that coordination around machine consensus is
ignored, or that decentralization is inexistent, but simply that the emphasis, relative to
competitors, is placed on social consensus mechanisms, especially the fostering of broad
and deep discussions with stakeholders.
Specifically, the DAOs that took this path (G2) relied on a large community of
developers, which they nurtured using a less decentralized approach than their G1
counterparts. For instance, they are concerned with project development and provide
developer support—much as Google did in the early days of the Android operating
system designed for smartphones. Launched in 2015, Ethereum managed to build
considerable awareness among users and developers in relation to its core innovation,
namely the ability to implement self-executing “smart contracts” within the blockchain.
As a result of strategic decision making and with the goal of mainstream adoption,
Ethereum has integrated a “Coinbase 28 Buy” widget into their Mist Beta 0.8.2. In the case
of Dash, the DAO pioneered the development of the X11 hashing algorithm to make
“mining” faster, more secure, and more energy efficient. The organization sees itself as

28

Coinbase is a major player in the cryptocurrency exchange sector.

84

composed of “investor volunteers”—“people [who] come together to invest in a network,
and also work on developing the network” (Daniel Diaz, interview #2, 2016).

6.2
Configurations of Coordination Mechanisms
Sufficient for DAO Decline (D1 and D2)
All configurations leading to decline are low in decentralization. More specifically,
deviating from the industry’s original vision about the need to remove central authorities
from organizational systems appears to be detrimental to early DAO growth, unless there
is a strong reliance on social consensus mechanisms, as is the case with G2. In D1, for
example, the DAOs that declined (e.g., Vericoin, Worldcoin, XCurrency) started off with
low reliance on the social consensus mechanism related to the depth of stakeholder
discussions. Without deep involvement from the developer community, DAOs based on
weaker decentralization schemes seem to suffer in the early stages of their development.
Compared to G2, D2 does not feature a strong reliance on social consensus mechanisms.
Instead, it relies on the use of machine routines to provide organizational stability (e.g.,
adjusting network validators’ rewards frequently to reduce their risk level and provide
them with a stable flow of income). It appears that blockchain system stability is better
coordinated by relying on a decentralized community than a centralized one (see, for
instance, Andreas Antonopoulos’s speech at the MIT Bitcoin Expo; Antonopoulos,
2016).
With regard to decentralized DAOs, some believe that “more usage will drive
development rather than [that] more development will drive the usage” (Pétur Árnason,
2017 interview #11, core developer of Auroracoin). But our results point to the primacy
of the breadth and depth of stakeholder discussions (G2) required to kick-start growth.
These discussions, in turn, lead to software updates that represent increases in the
innovation potential of the DAO, as recent research has demonstrated (Wang & Vergne,
2017). As Cassini explains, “It’s not the cryptography or the proof [. . .] that has an
influence on the profitability, but it’s more what community is behind that coin”
(emphasis added, interview #16). So, our results suggest that development drives usage,
at least among DAOs that are less reliant on decentralization to coordinate their activities.
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6.3

Propositions

Following the fsQCA results, I put forward three propositions.

6.3.1

Machine Consensus and Decentralization of Strategy
Making as Complements

Effective coordination, resting on accountability, predictability, and common
understanding (Okhuysen & Bechky, 2009), is a precondition for organizational growth
(Mintzberg, 1979). Based on my study of Bitcoin, I conjectured that machine consensus
mechanisms helped achieve common understanding in novel ways, to the extent that they
relied on machine routines that are open source, publicly auditable, and built by the
community. Generally speaking, common understanding is difficult to achieve in
decentralized organizations precisely because there is no centralized authority conveying
a clear sense of what the organization’s vision, strategy, and goals are.
Looking at the fsQCA findings from study #2, I found that organizational growth results
from a combination of strong reliance on both machine consensus and decentralization
(G1). I also found that centralization without strong social consensus always leads to
decline (D1 and D2).29 Taken together, these findings clearly point to the complementary
roles played by machine consensus and decentralization. Indeed, machine consensus
mechanisms are powerful drivers of common understanding—the one pillar of effective
coordination that is hard to achieve in decentralized settings.
In general, it is when strong machine consensus mechanisms are in place that
decentralization produces its most positive effects (e.g., high predictability, since no
insider has the discretionary power to affect operations) because its downsides are then
mitigated by a countervailing force (i.e., common understanding provided by machine
routines). An interview with Worldcoin’s core developer, Berzek (pseudonym, interview
#10), provides a concrete example of how machine consensus mechanisms (here, related
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The decline configuration associated with Auroracoin, not reported in Table 2, also features
decentralization and the absence of strong machine consensus.
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to stability provision) can provide the kind of predictability that is often missing from
decentralized organizations, thereby affecting their ability to coordinate effectively for
growth:
The problem with pure [PoW] coins (like us) is that many miners dump the coins
immediately for a profit so there is a constant downward pressure on the price [. .
.] This pressure is alleviated in a defined period of time—four years for Bitcoin,
[and] one per cent weekly in our case [. . .] So our curve does not have discrete
jumps [. . .] It is very smooth, therefore more predictable, and causes no anxiety
for investors or supporters.
Similarly, study stages #1 and #2 combined suggest that machine consensus fosters
accountability at the organizational but not at the task level, where random assignment of
tasks prevails. On the other hand, decentralized strategy making does the exact opposite
by giving autonomy and proper incentives to DAO members at the task level—even if
that implies less accountability at the organizational level, e.g., if a DAO causes harm,
who can be held responsible? From a coordination perspective, it thus makes sense for
machine consensus and decentralization mechanisms to complement each other
effectively, and our study demonstrates that this is indeed the case in the cryptocurrency
industry. I thus propose:
Proposition 1: Within DAOs, coordination based on machine consensus
mechanisms enhances common understanding at both the organizational and task
levels, but it enhances accountability and predictability only at the organizational
level. By contrast, coordination based on decentralized strategy making does not
enhance common understanding, but it does enhance accountability and
predictability at the task level. Therefore, coordination mechanisms based on
machine consensus and decentralized strategy making are complementary, at both
the organization and task levels. These complementarities make coordination
particularly effective and lead to DAO growth.
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6.3.2

Social Consensus as a Substitute for the Machine
Consensus-Decentralization Pair

Looking at G2, I find that social consensus mechanisms foster the growth of DAOs that
do not heavily rely on machine consensus or decentralized strategy making. This hints at
the existence of a substitution effect between social consensus, on the one hand, and
machine consensus and decentralization, on the other. The importance of social
consensus mechanisms is highlighted by Riccardo Spagni, the lead developer of the
Monero DAO (interview #18, 2017): “Focusing on things like getting investors is
pointless because all you’re doing is creating something that looks like a scam. Really all
you can do is just focus on building up the community so that you have contributors to
the project and you have people that are interested in testing the project and everything
else sort of comes from that.”
On a related note, Cohen emphasizes the crucial role played by stakeholder
discussions in the developer community:
Honestly, I think [. . .] the developer, main developer, and the circle of
contributing developers is particularly strong, [so] Blackcoin has retained, even
now, two years later, a degree of respect and you know, it is sort of the brand—I
mean of course this is a totally different consideration from the purely technical
ones, but brand recognition and stable user base and sense of trust that, you know,
this blockchain will not be dead tomorrow, those are very important in terms of
adoption. (interview #7)
So, even though DAOs tend to place “automation at the center” (Buterin, 2014),
machine consensus mechanisms need not be too heavily relied upon to generate growth
(as shown in G2), nor be too much in the background to produce decline (as shown in
D2). Arthur Breitman, core developer of the Tezos DAO, stated in an online interview,
“to be sure, there is some math that does give you strong guarantees . . . and these are
very, very strong guarantees. And then you have the [social] consensus itself, which . . .
is going to be an economic and social problem, and not a mathematical one” (Breitman,
2016).
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To further unpack the substitution effect between social consensus and the
machine consensus-decentralization pairing, we need to look at how social consensus
mechanisms provide the kind of common understanding, accountability, and
predictability needed for effective DAO coordination. Social consensus mechanisms
bring together communities of developers, users, and network validators in both formal
(e.g., BIPs) and informal (e.g., online forum discussions) ways. The breadth and depth of
these discussions, alongside network validators’ commitment to the DAO, create a sense
of common understanding at both the task and organizational levels, much like machine
consensus mechanisms. Social consensus mechanisms also enhance accountability and
predictability at the task level by connecting proposals for organizational change to realworld identities—something that machine consensus mechanisms are, by design, unable
to achieve (even though they enhance accountability and predictability at the
organizational level). However, without a heavy reliance on machine routines, social
consensus mechanisms may lead to inertia, since stakeholder involvement is at risk of
getting stuck at the discussion stage, without its being translated into action due to lower
automation levels. This is where a degree of centralized strategy making can come into
play to aggregate stakeholder contributions and define a course of action going forward.
Therefore, I postulate:
Proposition 2: Within DAOs, coordination based on social consensus
mechanisms enhances common understanding at both the organizational and task
levels (in a similar manner to machine consensus), but it enhances accountability
only at the task level (unlike machine consensus). By contrast, coordination based
on some degree of centralized strategy making enhances accountability at the
organizational level. Therefore, coordination based on social consensus
mechanisms acts as a substitute for coordination based on a combination of
machine consensus and decentralized strategy making. DAOs that are not too
decentralized but rely heavily on social consensus are able to grow, even in the
absence of strong machine consensus.
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6.3.3

Balancing Efficiency and Effectiveness—but Privileging
Effectiveness

A strong reliance on machine consensus mechanisms often leads to inefficiencies because
it entails duplication of effort (i.e., every miner must work on solving the next block) and
wasting resources (e.g., electricity and hardware). Nonetheless, consistent with the G1
configuration in Table 2, I found that DAOs that generate such inefficiencies can
coordinate effectively in order to grow. So it appears that seeking efficiencies is not a
precondition for success for DAOs. As Spagni explains, “It’s the same inefficiencies that
exist in blockchain technology. It’s a good sort of inefficiency. It’s the inefficiency you
want. You want some of these things to be difficult to do because it means that it’s also
difficult to shut down.” (interview #18)
A DAO that cannot be shut down becomes more predictable for its stakeholders, and in
turn this predictability enhances the DAO’s effectiveness (e.g., a system that holds
billions of dollars’ worth of cryptocurrency in user deposits cannot effectively process
payments when it risks being shut down, even if only temporarily). Besides,
inefficiencies at the level of machine consensus have an interesting implication in that
they enable the DAO to function with very little coordination at the task level. Indeed,
when each task is assigned by default to every organizational member in a way that
demands efforts that will ultimately be wasted, there is no need to coordinate either task
assignment or the corresponding allocation of resources (e.g., every network validator
must commit costly resources and try to solve the next block, even though only one
network validator will ultimately be rewarded). Instead, resources are allocated using
market mechanisms. As Evan Duffield, founder and lead developer of Dash explains, the
work of network validators within a DAO represents “a market within itself” (interview
#2, 2016):
We have a free-floating masternode network [i.e., paid nodes that have decisionmaking power based on voting rights], and so if there’s too many masternodes,
they’ll start making too little, a couple will drop off. And if there’s too few
masternodes, they’ll start making too much, and then that’ll increase incentives,
and some people will buy it. And so this is a stabilizing factor.
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In a similar fashion, reliance on extremely decentralized coordination structures—as I
argued before, these are a useful complement to machine routines—can lead to
inefficiencies because it inevitably brings about redundancies and slower decision
making. In line with our findings, Pike states, “The conundrum is you don’t really want
[a centralized organization or a foundation] if you believe in decentralization, but without
it, you’re not as efficient as you would otherwise be. So it’s kind of a more organic
process that is really undefined. I would say at this stage, everyone’s just trying to figure
out how to make decisions.” (interview #12)
Regarding the same trade-off, Spagni states, “[Decentralized self-organizing] is not as
efficient, but [. . .] from the perspective of a cryptocurrency, it creates an environment
that is impossible to shut down.” (interview #18)
I thus propose:
Proposition 3: DAOs balance efficiency with effectiveness. The more a DAO
relies on decentralization and machine consensus, the more likely it is to be
inefficient in terms of resource usage, but the more effective it becomes at
coordinating in order to grow.30
In what follows, I will discuss these findings in terms of theoretical implications, future
directions, followed by conclusions.

30

The optimal balance between efficiency and effectiveness depends on factors that are beyond the scope
of this study, such as the cost of external resources (electricity), the price of the cryptocurrency (a higher
price provides stronger incentives for network validators), the strength of the network effects, and the
extent to which the effectiveness of the DAO depends on the reliability of its blockchain infrastructure. In
the cryptocurrency/payments industry, the level of reliability expected from users is extremely high, but
this may not be the case in other industries in which DAOs compete.
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Chapter 7 Discussion and Conclusions

7

Discussion and Conclusions

DAOs are a new form of organizing that provide novel solutions to the four universal
problems—task division, task allocation, reward distribution, and information flows
(Puranam, Alexy & Reitzig, 2014). Motivated by establishing a deeper understanding of
the coordination mechanisms of DAOs, this research offers a theoretical framework
based on distributed consensus mechanisms.
Throughout this study, I have asked the following question: how can tasks be adequately
coordinated to enable organizational growth without placing human decision makers at
the center of an organization? Guided by findings from the Bitcoin pilot study, the threestage inductive research design provides tentative answers to this question, which I have
summarized in the three propositions developed above. In essence, this study identified a
new set of coordination mechanisms based on machine routines, which interact with
coordination mechanisms around social consensus and decentralized strategy making to
produce growth (or decline) under certain conditions that are detailed in the fsQCA
analyses. Effective coordination occurs through reliance on a previously unseen class of
stakeholders called “network validators” and, due to the random assignment of ultimately
redundant tasks to network validators, DAO growth sometimes occurs at the expense of
efficient resource usage.
In this concluding section I will highlight the high-level contributions of this
study to the literature on organizational task coordination, and I will outline some of the
broader implications of the rise of DAOs for organizational and management scholarship,
against the backdrop of a decreasing presence of the public corporation in contemporary
business life.

7.1

DAOs as a Novel Form of Organizing

DAOs are characterized by several unique organization design features that were
previously unseen in traditional organizations.
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DAOs enable extreme forms of decentralization. This research takes a first stab at
investigating blockchain-based implementations as a new form of organization design. It
contributes to the organization design literature by developing a theoretical framework to
make sense of DAOs. Specifically, it shows that machine consensus mechanisms,
powered by incentivized voluntary contributors who validate and record stakeholder
transactions, make DAOs uniquely positioned to offer new solutions to “the universal
problems of organizing” faced by “distributed organizations” (e.g., Wikipedia) that do
not rely on machine consensus (Puranam, Alexy & Reitzig, 2014: 166–169). Machine
consensus may bear resemblance with other technology-enabled coordination systems
such as version control, Uber, and Wikipedia, in the way task division and task allocation
is based on self-selection and is embedded in the algorithm. However, fundamentally,
version control is a technology system (instead of an organization), and unlike DAOs,
Uber and Wikipedia are centrally owned and managed by corporations or foundations,
which coordinate a large part of their tasks through centralized authorities.
It is important to distinguish DAOs from open source projects like Wikipedia in that,
while DAOs distribute ownership, governance, and control to various stakeholder groups,
platforms such as Wikipedia are centrally owned and managed by a centralized
organization, e.g., the Wikipedia Foundation Inc. The content on Wikipedia is also
centrally controlled and censored. The recent formation of Everipedia, a blockchainbased open source encyclopedia, serves as an application of DAO to provide an
uncensorable, decentralized encyclopedia that incentivizes voluntary contributors with a
token called “IQ.” Everipedia stands as a perfect example how DAOs compare and
contrast with distributed organizations, and how DAOs can be applied to make such
projects truly decentralized. Admittedly, DAOs enable an extreme form of
decentralization powered by consensus mechanisms.
Similarly, in contrast to community-governed organizational forms (e.g., OSSD projects),
DAOs have a distinctive goal that guides the “standard development” of the organizing
principle rather than “software development” for the product (interview #26). The DAO
organizing principle, rooted in decentralization and automation, transforms the dynamics
of community-based organizing to focus extensively on consensus-based decentralization

93

of decision making and coordination. As a result, while formal authority tends to develop
in OSSD communities over time (O’Mahony & Ferraro, 2007), DAOs aim to mitigate
and distribute authority by integrating machine consensus with social consensus
mechanisms.
Organizational innovation vs. technological innovation: Two significant innovations
underpin Bitcoin: a technological one, namely the public and distributed ledger
technology called blockchain, which securely maintains an immutable record of all user
transactions; and an organizational innovation, namely, the existence of an open network
of users with special roles and rights called miners, who lend computing power to secure
the network in exchange for newly minted bitcoins and voting rights with respect to
future protocol revisions (Davidson, De Filippi & Potts, 2016a; 2016b).
As an industry expert puts it, a blockchain will not work without Bitcoin or the consensus
algorithm (e.g., PoW) behind it (Antonopoulos, 2016 speech31). And the reason is
simple—a blockchain can only ensure the core of its true innovation, namely an open,
borderless and censorship-resistant system, through the organization design that performs
tasks and provides rewards in novel and unique ways. The DAO’s innovation drives the
blockchain technology, and this logic is fundamentally different from what we have seen
in OSSDs and other self-organized organizations (Lee & Edmondson, 2017).

7.2

Distributed Consensus Mechanisms

Coordination by consensus mechanisms. Results from the pilot study suggest that
distributed consensus is what makes the DAO organizational innovation possible.
Subsequently, findings from the first stage reveal three key features of task coordination
within DAOs. First, machine consensus mechanisms, driven by sets of machine
routines, are meant to deliver provable security for user transactions and to ensure
organizational stability in a context in which stakeholders can come and go at will.

31

Sources: https://www.newsbtc.com/2016/06/01/andreas-antonopoulos-explains-blockchain-nothingwithout-bitcoin/; https://youtu.be/mRQs9Y6CUSU.
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Machine consensus, both at the level of the tasks that it governs (e.g., record keeping)
and at the broader organizational level, contributes rather straightforwardly to common
understanding (i.e., all the machine routines are open source and publicly auditable). But
its contribution to the other two integrative conditions for coordination, namely
predictability and accountability, deserves a more nuanced explanation.
Since every transaction remains traceable indefinitely based on its immutable blockchain
record—this characteristic ties transactions to a specific network validator, a sender, and
a recipient—accountability seems ensured at the organizational level. However, network
validators are not assigned ex ante to specific transactions, since DAOs do not rely on
hierarchy to assign tasks. In fact, network validators are randomly assigned to their tasks
(e.g., with Bitcoin, the first miner who is lucky enough to guess a long random number
will add the next block to the ledger and receive the coin rewards). This feature is meant
to prevent malicious users from attacking particularly valuable nodes in the network; it is
not unlike a situation in which a bank robber knows that, out of the 5,000 vaults out there,
only one contains the gold reserves, but cannot know which one it is because that vault is
chosen randomly by a computer program (and the gold is randomly moved to a new vault
every ten minutes).
Consequently, DAOs achieve disintermediation through randomization of work and costs
of validation. In particular, routine work is performed in a purposefully redundant and
wasteful way to coordinate the main tasks; effectiveness, in the form of security provision
and stability provision, can trump efficiency to serve as the primary organizational goal.
By randomization, difficulty fluctuation, and inefficiency at the task level, DAOs ensure
organizational level accountability and predictability. A conceptual framework is shown
in Figure 13.

95

Figure 13 Conceptual Framework of Consensus Mechanisms and Conditions at the
Task vs. Organizational Levels

So, even though, at the task level (e.g., transaction verification, generation of coin
rewards), accountability cannot be assigned ex ante, this very feature contributes to
accountability at the organizational level (i.e., it is a way to prevent cyber attacks and
thus ensure data integrity for the ledger). Similarly, this random assignment of tasks is
clearly at odds with enhancing predictability, but only at the task level. At the broader
organizational level, randomization actually contributes to the DAO’s predictability by
ensuring that transactions will be processed as per the code, without outside interference.
Interestingly, these coordination mechanisms do entail duplication of effort and
redundancies. Instead of using one vault and protecting it very well, Bitcoin uses
thousands of identical vaults and makes it too costly for thieves to guess which one
contains the money. Put differently, in order to achieve their goals (e.g., building a peerto-peer value-transaction network), DAOs deliberately waste resources (e.g., thousands
of miners consume hardware resources and electricity simultaneously when only one
miner would be enough to verify transactions). In short, DAOs work with coordination
mechanisms that clearly emphasize effectiveness at the cost of efficiency.
As non-hierarchical organizations, DAOs face the same high-level predictability
challenges as OSSD communities due to a lack of formalization in terms of role
definition for strategy making (Okhuysen & Bechky, 2009). However, unlike OSSD
communities, DAOs are able to overcome some of these predictability challenges by
relying on machine consensus and by integrating it with social consensus through a new
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class of paid stakeholders, namely, network validators. In DAOs, social consensus is
meant to produce agreement across stakeholder groups about organizational strategy by
facilitating stakeholder discussions and network validators’ commitment. Offline and
online discussions, as well as votes recorded in the public ledger, readily contribute to
enhancing accountability and common understanding and to providing stakeholders with
updates regarding how predictable future organizational changes will be.
Machine consensus and social consensus are eventually integrated and aligned through
reliance on network validators who make decisions in more or less decentralized ways.
The third important feature of task coordination within DAOs is thus decentralization,
conceived of here as a continuum that underpins decision making at every stage. With
Bitcoin, for instance, new ideas are generated in a decentralized way by developers
across the world. These ideas are subsequently pooled together in discrete blocks called
BIPs and then discussed informally in online discussion forums. Finally, they are voted
upon formally by decentralized miners who ultimately update the software, which is
released in a more centralized fashion by the DAO’s core developers and is based on the
accepted BIPs. Although decentralization makes DAOs’ ability to adapt less predictable
at the organizational level (e.g., the strategic direction may be unclear, resulting in
inertia), it also makes them more predictable at the task level (e.g., no organizational
insider has the power to defraud a user). On the other hand, decentralization removes
some of the unpredictability that comes from the existence of high-level managers with a
lot of discretionary power (e.g., there is no CEO with the power to decide on a merger),
but which can at times decrease accountability (e.g., if something goes wrong, who can
be held responsible?).
Interestingly, then, coordination mechanisms around machine consensus, social
consensus, and decentralization of strategy making contribute to accountability,
predictability, and common understanding in different ways and at different levels of the
organization (task level vs. organizational level).
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7.3
A New Form of Coordination: Coordination with
Machine Consensus and Network Validators
DAOs offer an alternative to human-centered organizational design by introducing new
coordination mechanisms based on machine consensus, which automates many of the
routine tasks performed by the organization through the use of an immutable database
shared across all stakeholder groups (the blockchain). It would be inconceivable for a
traditional business organization to require all employees to perform the same routine
task but then only reward one single employee drawn at random while discarding
everyone else’s work. Yet this counter-intuitive way of coordinating tasks is necessary
for a DAO to achieve predictability, accountability, and common understanding, and for
it to be able to reliably disintermediate transactions (Lopp, 2016). Besides, even though
DAOs coordinate tasks rather formally, organizational members cannot feel coerced by
management (since there is none) and can choose to leave and join another DAO at
will—so DAOs offer an alternative to the usual trade-off between formal coordination
and organizational member autonomy (Adler & Borys, 1996).
Beyond the mere identification of a new set of coordination mechanisms (machine
routines), this study contributes to a finer understanding of task coordination within
organizations. Specifically, while our research confirms the crucial role played by
predictability, accountability, and common understanding in coordination (Okhuysen and
Bechky, 2009), it also demonstrates the practical value of distinguishing between the task
and organizational levels when examining these three pillars (Young-Hyman, 2017).
Indeed, certain coordination mechanisms (e.g., decentralized strategy making) enhance
predictability at the task level but not at the organizational level, while others (e.g.,
machine consensus) do the inverse. Thus, it becomes crucial for organizations to have
integrating mechanisms in place to compensate for these discrepancies.
The mining process, which is based on competitive bookkeeping by network validators,
plays such an integrating role. In the coordination literature, integrators are defined as
“formally mandated managerial roles meant to promote coordination across specialized
but interdependent organizational subunits, yet they do so without relying on formal
authority” (Stan & Puranam, 2016). Integrators such as project managers (Wheelwright
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& Clark, 1992) or account managers (Iansiti & Clark, 1994) play an essential role in the
organizational structure by facilitating a “steady state of coordination” between
stakeholder groups within and around organizations (Stan & Puranam, 2016; Mohrman,
1993). However, in DAOs, network validators are able to act as “integrators” without
holding a “formally mandated managerial role,” thanks to the machine consensus
mechanisms that provide incentives to stabilize the organization in the long run. Network
validators integrate functions across levels—payment processing at the blockchain level,
security provision at the network level, and voting at the protocol level—but their work
goes beyond traditional role-based coordination (Bechky, 2006), as they can join or leave
the organization at will and do not depend on managerial oversight (Stan & Puranam,
2016).
In this sense, there is no pooled task interdependence in DAOs, but instead a randomized
assignment of tasks spawned by a new form of automated coordination (Thompson,
1967; Daft & Armstrong, 2012; Okhuysen & Bechky, 2009). This is precisely why
coordination within DAOs differs from the forms of coordination observed in OSSD
projects. As Okhuysen & Bechky (2009) rightly point out, “Post-industrial work requires
assembling specialized knowledge in ways that we have not done before while facing
new task environments.” In both DAOs and OSSD projects, communities of volunteers
manage and maintain code on open-source software platforms, making it transparent and
easy to share (O’Mahony, 2003; O’Mahony, 2007; O’Mahony, Puranam et al., 2014;
West & O’Mahony, 2008). Yet while OSSD projects may face predictability problems
due to the lack of clear governance structures (Okhuysen & Bechky, 2009; O’Mahony &
Bechky, 2008), DAOs rely on machine consensus mechanisms to compensate for this
while maintaining a high level of decentralization. And this is how DAOs provide novel
solutions to the old problems of organizing.

7.4
Growth Implications: Organizational Growth:
DAOs vs. Traditional
Organizational growth is historically conceived of as driven by the need to acquire
external resources, such as financial capital, especially for new ventures. Centralization
of production serves as the main enabler behind modern corporate growth as it is
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conceived of as having the ability to enhance coordination efficiency, corporate wealth or
managerial strategic decision power (Chandler, 1977; 1990; Perrow, 2002). For industrial
corporations that seek either scale or scope, financial indicators such as sales and
financial returns are used to capture growth in the literature (e.g., Eisenhardt &
Schoonhven, 1990; Larson, 1992; Weinzimmer, Nystrom & Freeman, 1998).
What does growth mean in the context of non-centralized, non-hierarchical DAOs, and
how does it challenge the idea of growth as conventionally defined? On the one hand, if
we focus on DAOs’ ability to support a two-sided platform for value exchanges (e.g., as
payment systems), mainstream adoption of a DAO will rely on the growth of users who
use the DAO for transactions to generate the network effects. On the other hand, in
theory, DAOs can survive as long as there is one validator and some users on the
network, although the security of the network and the health of the blockchain may be
compromised. Fundamentally, as my interviews revealed, mainstream adoption stands as
an important goal for cryptocurrency DAOs to make mining efficient (because the same
level of security generated by miners can now be used by a large user base), to ensure the
health of the network, and to retain the value of the cryptocurrency token.
Specifically, early growth is an important indication of the success or failure of a crucial
process called “bootstrapping” that is required to get a cryptocurrency DAO off the
ground:
There is a tricky interplay between three different ideas in Bitcoin: the security of
the blockchain, the health of the mining ecosystem, and the value of the currency.
We obviously want the blockchain to be secure for Bitcoin to be a viable
currency. For the blockchain to be secure, an adversary must not be able to
overwhelm the consensus process. This in turn means that an adversary cannot
create a lot of mining nodes and take over 50 per cent or more of the new block
creation . . . When Bitcoin was first created, none of these three existed. There
were no miners other than Nakamoto himself running the mining software.
Bitcoin didn’t have a lot of value as a currency. And the blockchain was, in fact,
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insecure because there was not a lot of mining going on and anybody could have
easily overwhelmed this process. (Narayanan et al., 2016: 70-71)
Thus, it is reasonable to say that growth in the user base measured by transactions
captures the growth of the consensus base formed by key stakeholders—validators, users,
and developers. Consequently, this consensus base determines the health and the value of
the DAO. Early growth in the use of the cryptocurrency DAO captured by growth in the
number of transactions instead of financial indicators also helps rule out speculations
reflected in price or market capitalization. This consensus-based notion of growth
challenges the traditional growth motivated by efficiency, scale and scope economies,
and centralized power and control.

7.5
7.5.1

Limitations and Future Directions
Limitations

The limitations of this research come from several assumptions that shape the boundary
conditions for the generalization of findings.
First, I focus on the internal stakeholders who have direct decision-making power over
the blockchain and protocol. The reason for this decision is to focus on those
organizational actors whose tasks are directly being coordinated by machine versus social
consensus. Specifically, my decision to focus on network validators and developers is
based on my interviews and readings. While fully acknowledging the role of other types
of nodes in maintaining the network (e.g., full nodes without mining functions and
lightweight nodes which do not have to store the full blockchain ledger), a simplified
model better serves the purpose of this study as an early attempt to understand DAOs
from a management and organizational perspective. Similarly, external stakeholders, such
as merchants, regulators, and third-party services, who do not directly interact with the
operations of DAOs are precluded from my current scope of organization design. Moving
forward, they represent important research opportunities to study governance and interorganizational coordination (e.g., Hsieh, Vergne & Wang, 2017).
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Second, this study assumes stable external environments. This assumption simplifies the
complexity a DAO faces. For example, even though the Bitcoin blockchain is extremely
secure, when an external Bitcoin exchange is hacked (for example, in the most recent
case, a Bitcoin exchange, NiceHash, was hacked with $64 million worth of bitcoin
stolen), Bitcoin’s transaction volume and value will certainly be affected. Network
activities, such as mining, may also be affected by the drop of token value depending on
the health of the mining ecosystem.
Finally, I assume a homogenously distributed network without concentration. For
example, I do not distinguish the incentive structure between mining pools (i.e., miners
pooling computing power together to have a better chance of winning) and solo miners.
This is intended to simplify and focus the argument on general coordination problems of
a distributed organization.
In terms of data analysis, as I pointed out in Chapter 5, there is a trade-off between
sampling a range of cryptocurrency DAOs with variations in their design and focusing on
cases founded at around the same time in order to control for cohort effects. I made a
choice to focus on the former but sampled a number of cryptocurrency DAOs from
different industry stages proportional to the founding rate to make my sample
representative. Additionally, since fsQCA is not a variance-based method that requires
control variables as in regression models, the absence of the explanatory condition
“industry stage” will not take away the influence of other conditions as part of a
necessary or sufficient configuration.

7.5.2

Future Directions

Inter-organizational coordination and governance between DAOs. DAOs have opened
up ample opportunities for future organization research. For example, distributed trust
has transformed traditional coordination relationships that defined organizational
boundaries (Seidel, 2018). Specifically, to extend the research theme of this study, interorganizational coordination relationships are of particular interest. For example, how
does the utility layer of a DAO (e.g., Ethereum) coordinate with a second layer ICO
token (e.g., VeChain or EOS) that builds its products and services on the utility platform?
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How would the shift of trust relations change inter-organizational dynamics that were
originally based on social relations or transaction costs (Seidel, 2017)? How do these
external stakeholders exert influence on the decision-making process of DAOs? And how
does the new form of coordination change how we think about internal and external
governance?
Longitudinal studies on DAO growth. As the industry grows and matures, it is necessary
to study the DAO growth trajectory over time and compare it with public corporations
and identify whether and how fundamental differences exist in their growth patterns. In
addition, performing cohort studies will be feasible and useful for longitudinal studies to
control for industry effects and perhaps to compare patterns across various industry
stages. Finally, alternative growth measures may shed light on the multiplicity of DAO
objectives. For instance, while users contribute to generating network effects, investors
drive up the value of DAOs, and regulators stand as the institutional gatekeepers that
determine the growth or decline of the industry. By considering a broader range of
stakeholders, it would be possible to capture what Buterin (2017) called “multifactorial
consensus,” where “different coordination flags 32 and different mechanisms and groups
are polled, and the ultimate decision depends on the collective results of all of these
mechanisms together.”
In sum, the rich context, with abundant data sources, provides ample opportunity for
future research on the evolution and sustained growth of DAOs, as well as contingencies
under which DAOs are viable and can be implemented in varied applications (such as
smart contracts, and signature services), in hybrid forms (e.g., centralized financial
institutions integrating a distributed organizational form as a solution to enhance
efficiency).

32

Coordination flags refer to votes signaling preferences, for example, whether or not a hard fork is
happening (Buterin, 2017b).
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7.6

Managerial Implications

Insights from this study are directly relevant to the FinTech revolution in action right
now. Traditional financial institutions are increasingly interested in blockchain
technology and have been extensively experimenting with the possibility of blockchain
integration. It is foreseeable that hybrid forms of traditional and DAO can emerge,
similar to what has taken place between OSSD and private sponsors, such as private
corporations (O’Mahony, 2007).
For large international banks to adopt the blockchain technology, permissioned 33
blockchains are often necessary for enterprise solutions to protect proprietary assets.
While managers are contemplating the future of enterprise blockchains, this research
provides a new way of thinking about adopting blockchains not in terms of technology
adoption but in terms of the integration of new forms of governance and coordination.
That is, if machine consensus and decentralization are complements, as suggested by the
findings, large banks may choose to adopt the machine consensus (i.e., the blockchain
and protocol) without adjusting the coordination structure toward the decentralization end
of the continuum. The extent to which a highly centralized organization can capitalize on
the unique features of blockchain technology is still a puzzle.
Banking is, ultimately, a centralized system . . . It's great if you want to have a
decentralized currency that isn't controlled by any one person, but if you have a
bank or a central government providing it then it stops being decentralised and the
whole blockchain technology aspect becomes, sort of, redundant . . . As soon as
you centralize it and there's one controller it's unnecessary to use anything other
than a database . . . The advantage of a block chain comes when you're farming
out the data to anyone and you don't know who the actors are. But if it's a private
chain and you know who the actors are and you can trust them then it's not worth
it anymore.

33

[James Lovejoy, Core developer at Vertcoin, interview #5]

Permissioned or private blockchains refer to DAOs that only allow trusted nodes in the network to work
as validators. The validation may or may not involve costs such as proof-of-work requires.

104

Therefore, for managers to think about blockchain adoption, the complementarity
between machine consensus and decentralization cannot be overlooked. On the other
hand, from the standpoint of social consensus, a private blockchain means the
development team will be paid employees either of the financial institution or of the
FinTech start-up that provides the service (e.g., Ripple and Stellar). How is this setting
different from traditional firms and how will adopting firms capitalize on the advantages
offered by early adoption?
The financial industry is only the first one to be impacted by distributed organization—
any industry relying heavily on intermediaries (e.g., brokers) can be deeply affected by
this form of organizing.

7.7
Organizations of the Future: An Under-Socialized
Worldview?
In the last section of the dissertation, I conclude my research with a few extended higherlevel thoughts.
1. Code is Law?
The emergence of DAOs, to an extent, reinforces the under-socialized post-capitalist
worldview characterized by digitalization, decentralization, and disintermediation and by
the idea that “code is law” (Lessig, 2006), that Bitcoin is the “trust machine” (Economist,
2015a) wherein human trust is no longer necessary, and that DAOs require “little
coordination” (Nakamoto, 2008). Intriguingly, Vitalik Buterin, co-founder of Ethereum,
who first proposed the idea of DAOs characterized by “automation at the center, humans
at the edges,” shared his concerns about DAO on-chain governance34 that relies on tokenholder voting rules built in machine routines in a recent post:

34

On-chain governance refers to the practice of embedding DAO governance rules in the protocol. Onchain governance is intended to create a self-amending system that “seamlessly amends the rules governing
its protocol and rewards protocol development” (https://www.tezos.com/governance). It is said to have the
benefit of avoiding decentralized informal human-decision making systems and can evolve rapidly to
incorporate any necessary technological advancement. Proponents of on-chain governance generally
believe that it avoids the downsides of informal governance, including being unstable and prone to chain
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People who think that the purpose of blockchains is to completely expunge soft
mushy human intuitions and feelings in favor of completely algorithmic
governance (emphasis on completely) are absolutely crazy[.]…[L]oosely coupled
voting as done by Carbonvotes35 and similar systems [are] underrated. (Buterin,
2017b)
In contrast, Buterin thinks that informal governance mechanisms such as Carbonvotes,
that are not based on token ownership, serve as an important social means for distributed
consensus mechanisms to work. According to Buterin (2017a; 2017b; 2018), the undersocialized, on-chain voting that heavily relies on machine routines risks overlooking
other representative stakeholders’ roles in coordination by focusing solely on token
holders. Instead, he argues that a balance needs to be struck among stakeholder groups
for a collective consensus based on formal and informal votes from the core development
teams, coin holders, in line with established norms and a roadmap. This view reinforces
what we learned from this research, namely, that the growth of a DAO depends on
balancing the three elements—machine consensus, social consensus, and decentralization
of decision making. Code is not law, and social consensus still matters.
2. When is DAO a Viable Form?
Research indicates that the technological innovation potential behind cryptocurrencies
stands as the key driver of their market value (Wang & Vergne, 2017). But, as the
Economist (2015b) rightly points out, blockchain technology has far-reaching
applications beyond cryptocurrency and payments. In fact, blockchain-based organizing
and the resulting DAOs have the ability to replace centralized intermediaries in other
applications requiring complex coordination such as asset ownership tracking, trade
financing, digital identity provision, supply chain traceability, and more. Besides, in the

splits, and having the tendency to become centralized (Buterin, 2017b). On-chain governance is conceived
of as “tightly coupled voting” across Buterin’s articles on blockchain governance (e.g., Buterin, 2017b:
2018).
35

CarbonVote is an informal voting platform for the Ethereum community (see: http://carbonvote.com/).
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last three years, more than fifty new ventures received seed funding using blockchainpowered “initial coin offerings,” thereby bypassing, at least partly, the use of venture
capitalist intermediaries to obtain funding faster and at more favorable valuations (e.g., in
2014, Ethereum raised $18.4 million in a few days and is now valued at $34 billion).
Therefore, DAOs are able to serve as intermediary organizations, in which a high level of
security and immutability is a desired feature enabled by the consensus mechanism and
distributed trust it produces.
3. Market? Hierarchy? Network? Broader Implications for Organizational and
Management Scholarship
DAOs are coordinated by consensus mechanisms. Thus, DAOs are different from
markets coordinated by price mechanism, hierarchies coordinated by fiat, or networks
coordinated by social relations (Powell, 1991). How should one make sense of DAOs?
DAOs are not governed by principal-agent relationships, since they do not have
shareholders or managers (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Because they do not rely on fiat or
hierarchies and operate transparently using public blockchains and open-source software,
they are, to some extent, immune to the issues of opportunism and information
asymmetry (Williamson, 1975). And because they operate with little human coordination
and do not incur costs for monitoring employees, they may behave in ways that
traditional perspectives in organizational economics are ill-equipped to capture. In
particular, the growth of DAOs is likely not bound by increases in the marginal cost of
organizing (because DAOs are not hierarchies) (Coase, 1937), and the cost of conducting
additional transactions within DAOs can theoretically decrease with size owing to
positive network externalities. Thus, at this stage, the scholarly community may lack the
theoretical tools needed to understand either the growth of DAOs or, more generally
speaking, what determines the boundaries of such organizations. The present study only
begins to tackle this problem. Future scholarship is needed to propose revised theoretical
frameworks to further our understanding of the DAO phenomenon.
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4. Decentralized Autonomous Organizations: An Alternative to the Public
Corporation?
In a thought-provoking essay, entitled “After the Corporation,” Gerald Davis remarks
that:
[T]here are fewer than half as many public corporations today as there were
fifteen years ago . . . The public corporation in the US is now unnecessary for
production [and] unsuited for stable employment . . . Although formal
organizations have long been the go‐to format for nearly every organized activity
in the industrialized West . . . they are no longer the obvious default option . . .
And while Linux and Wikipedia are cliché examples, they nonetheless serve as
proof of concept: it is possible for voluntary, dispersed, collaborative, relatively
non‐hierarchical forms of organizing not just to work well, but to far surpass their
privately‐produced alternatives. (Davis, 2013: 284; 290; 299; 301)
Meanwhile, over the last few months, over 150 DAOs have gone public through initial
coin offerings, a public sale through which the general public can acquire, early on,
cryptocurrency tokens to support the development of the organization (ICOtracker,
2017). While the number of public corporations is dwindling—there are 37 per cent
fewer today than there were in 1997 (VanderMey, 2017)—DAOs are on the rise.
Outside the payments sector, DAOs are providing new solutions for supply-chain
management in the luxury goods industry, record keeping in trade finance, trustedidentity provision in online environments, and patient-history management in the
healthcare sector. What these industries have in common is that their business activities
are prone to moral hazard and behavioral uncertainty. As a result, expensive
intermediaries are heavily relied upon to provide trust to the interacting parties (Zucker,
1986). Going forward, DAOs may be able to provide competitive alternatives for
organizing in those sectors.
More than 30 years ago, Rothschild and Whitt (1986: 114) identified factors that should
lead to the development of “collective organizations.” These included the demystification

108

of knowledge, defined as the process whereby “formerly exclusive, obscure, or esoteric
bodies of knowledge are simplified, explicated, and made available to the membership at
large” (cited in Davis, 2013: 301). By publishing all software related to the blockchain,
protocol, and peer-to-network in an open-source format, DAOs are well on track to
achieve this demystification. In fact, the Economist (2015b) argues that, building on the
vision of Ethereum co-founder Vitalik Buterin, the ultimate goal of DAOs is to serve as
“virtual companies that are basically just sets of [open-source] rules running on . . .
blockchain[s].”
At a theoretical level, the shift from the public corporation to the DAO may be a radical
one, and this research represents a first attempt at exploring its implications from the
viewpoint of organizational scholarship. I hope that organizational and management
scholars will pay attention to these developments that are currently changing the face of
the heavily intermediated form of capitalism that has prevailed in our economies since
the seventeenth century.
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Appendices
Appendix A The Byzantine Generals Problem
The Byzantine Generals Problem refers to the problem of reaching synchronous
consensus in a distributed network with the presence of dishonest actors. The name
originates from the hypothetical situation under which a group of generals in the
Byzantine army surround an enemy city. The Byzantine generals first need to agree on a
common battle plan of action, for instance, whether to attack or to retreat—at the same
time (Lamport et al., 1982). A half-hearted attack leads to coordination failure, which
results in a defeat. Second, the generals can only communicate via messengers, and third,
one or more of the generals may be traitors and may mislead others.
As traitors may decide to go against the group decision or deliver misinformation such
that loyal generals cannot arrive at a unified plan, the goal of the Byzantine Generals
Problem is to find a solution for all the loyal generals to arrive at a plan while
neutralizing the possibility of the traitorous generals causing coordination failures (i.e.,
the adoption a bad plan) (Narayanan et al., 2015). It has been proved that this goal is
impossible to achieve if over one-third of the generals are traitors (Lamport et al., 1982;
Narayanan et al., 2015).
Fischer and colleagues (1985) further extend the analysis to asynchronous systems in
which nodes behave deterministically. They show that consensus is impossible with even
only a single faulty process. “The problem is for all the data manager processes that have
participated in the processing of a particular transaction to agree on whether to install the
transaction’s results in the database or to discard them” (Fischer, Lynch & Paterson,
1985), hence the presence of the “transaction commit problem”. In this commit problem,
“all data managers must make the same decision in order to preserve the consistency of
the database” in a distributed system where data is being exchanged and processed. The
solution is only possible if and only if all network actors are completely honest and
reliable, which is impossible to achieve.
Bitcoin combines public key cryptography, digital signatures, and proof of work and, for
the first time and solved the impossibility theorem proposed by Fischer and colleague.
Bitcoin solves the Byzantine Generals Problem by providing the “generals” (i.e., network
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validators) with economic incentives through block reward. It also imposes costs as
disincentives for being dishonest through proof of work and by compromising on
consensus timing (i.e., the 10-minute block time on average). This explains why Bitcoin
and the underlying blockchain technology represent such a significant technological
break-through.
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Appendix B: Semi-Structured Interview Guide
** Each interview begins with a brief introduction of myself, the research project, and the
objective of the interview. The open-ended structure permits conversations to develop
and allows me to follow up on ideas the participants wish to elaborate on.
1. Please describe your background and how you got into Bitcoin.
2. Please describe your role, your involvement and experience working on Bitcoin.
3. How are BIPs (or similar proposals) different from (or similar to) existing opensource software development projects in terms of their code modification
processes?
4.

What determines the success/failure of a BIP?

5. Who determines how much consensus is enough consensus?
6. What does “lack of consensus” mean in the cryptocurrency context?
7. What are miners’ role in activating BIPs?
8. How does coordination between developers and miners happen?
9. What are the biggest challenges for BIPs (or similar proposals) moving forward?
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Appendix C Types and Roles of Nodes
As shown in Figure 14, a Bitcoin node is a combination of four functions: wallet services
(W), mining (M), full blockchain database (B), and network routing (N) (Antonopoulos,
2014: 140). Where this research focuses on mining (M), wallet services (W) refer to the
software that keeps users’ Bitcoin addresses and private keys. Wallet services allow users
to send, receive, and store bitcoins (Antonopoulos, 2014). The blockchain database (B)
function refers to the maintenance of a full copy of the entire Bitcoin transaction history
on the blockchain public ledger. The network routing (N) function is required for all
nodes to communicate with one another and to participate in the network. All nodes have
this routing function (Antonopoulos, 2014).
Figure 14 The four functions of a Bitcoin network node: Wallet, Miner, full
blockchain database, and network routing
(Adopted from Figure 6-1, Antonopoulos, 2014: 140)

Figure 15 lists various types of nodes with different combinations of these functions.
Please note that pool protocol servers such as “Stratum” (S) or “Pool” (P) are additional
routing services that connect lightweight mining pools to the main Bitcoin peer-to-peer
network. They do not belong to the immediate Bitcoin peer-to-peer network, but to the
extended network, which is not considered internal to the organization. A lightweight
client (or simplified payment verification (SPV) client) does not have to store a copy of
the full blockchain history. Instead, it tracks only the user’s wallet, and is not responsible
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for transaction validation. It relies on a third party (e.g., Stratum) or peers to obtain
partial information of the blockchain and interact with the Bitcoin network
(Antonopoulos, 2014).
Individual miners can join mining pools to pool their hash power and increase their
chance of winning. Miners participating in such pools may get a share of the reward.
Mining pool participants interact indirectly with the Bitcoin network through a third party
via the mining protocol (Antonopoulos, 2014).
Figure 16 illustrates the Bitcoin network. For the purposes of this study,
organizational boundaries are defined to include only those nodes connected by the
Bitcoin protocol (orange ties).
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Figure 15 Types of Nodes on the extended Bitcoin Network
(Adopted from Figure 6-2, Antonopoulos, 2014: 142)
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Figure 16 The extended Bitcoin Network
(Adopted from Figure 6-3, Antonopoulos, 2014: 143)
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Appendix D List of All BIPs
#

Layer

Title

Owner

Type

Status

1

BIP Purpose and
Guidelines

Amir Taaki

Process

Replaced

2

BIP process, revised

Luke Dashjr

Process

Active

8

Version bits with
lock-in by height

Shaolin Fry

Informational

Draft

9

Version bits with
timeout and delay

Pieter Wuille,
Peter Todd,
Greg Maxwell,
Rusty Russell

Informational

Final

10

Applications

Multi-Sig Transaction
Distribution

Alan Reiner

Informational

Withdrawn

11

Applications

M-of-N Standard
Transactions

Gavin
Andresen

Standard

Final

12

Consensus
(soft fork)

OP_EVAL

Gavin
Andresen

Standard

Withdrawn

13

Applications

Address Format for
pay-to-script-hash

Gavin
Andresen

Standard

Final

14

Peer Services

Protocol Version and
User Agent

Amir Taaki,
Patrick
Strateman

Standard

Final

15

Applications

Aliases

Amir Taaki

Standard

Deferred

16

Consensus
(soft fork)

Pay to Script Hash

Gavin
Andresen

Standard

Final

17

Consensus
(soft fork)

OP_CHECKHASHVERIF
Y (CHV)

Luke Dashjr

Standard

Withdrawn

18

Consensus
(soft fork)

hashScriptCheck

Luke Dashjr

Standard

Proposed
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19

Applications

M-of-N Standard
Transactions (Low
SigOp)

20

Applications

URI Scheme

Luke Dashjr

Standard

Replaced

21

Applications

URI Scheme

Nils Schneider,
Matt Corallo

Standard

Final

22

API/RPC

getblocktemplate Fundamentals

Luke Dashjr

Standard

Final

23

API/RPC

getblocktemplate Pooled Mining

Luke Dashjr

Standard

Final

30

Consensus
(soft fork)

Duplicate
transactions

Pieter Wuille

Standard

Final

31

Peer Services

Pong message

Mike Hearn

Standard

Final

32

Applications

Hierarchical
Deterministic Wallets

Pieter Wuille

Informational

Final

33

Peer Services

Stratized Nodes

Amir Taaki

Standard

Draft

34

Consensus
(soft fork)

Block v2, Height in
Coinbase

Gavin
Andresen

Standard

Final

35

Peer Services

mempool message

Jeff Garzik

Standard

Final

36

Peer Services

Custom Services

Stefan Thomas

Standard

Draft

37

Peer Services

Connection Bloom
filtering

Mike Hearn,
Matt Corallo

Standard

Final

38

Applications

Passphrase-protected
private key

Mike Caldwell,
Aaron Voisine

Standard

Draft

Applications

Mnemonic code for
generating
deterministic keys

Marek
Palatinus,
Pavol Rusnak,

Standard

Proposed

39

Luke Dashjr

Standard

Draft
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Aaron Voisine,
Sean Bowe

Standard

BIP
number
allocated

40

API/RPC

Stratum wire protocol

Marek
Palatinus

41

API/RPC

Stratum mining
protocol

Marek
Palatinus

Standard

BIP
number
allocated

42

Consensus
(soft fork)

A finite monetary
supply for Bitcoin

Pieter Wuille

Standard

Draft

43

Applications

Purpose Field for
Deterministic Wallets

Marek
Palatinus,
Pavol Rusnak

Informational

Draft

Applications

Multi-Account
Hierarchy for
Deterministic Wallets

Marek
Palatinus,
Pavol Rusnak

Standard

Proposed

45

Applications

Structure for
Deterministic P2SH
Multisignature
Wallets

Manuel Araoz,
Ryan X.
Charles, Matias
Alejo Garcia

Standard

Proposed

47

Applications

Reusable Payment
Codes for Hierarchical
Deterministic Wallets

Justus Ranvier

Informational

Draft

Applications

Derivation scheme
for P2WPKH-nestedin-P2SH based
accounts

Daniel Weigl

Informational

Draft

50

March 2013 Chain
Fork Post-Mortem

Gavin
Andresen

Informational

Final

60

Fixed Length
"version" Message
(Relay-Transactions
Field)

Amir Taaki

Standard

Draft

44

49

Peer Services
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61

Peer Services

Reject P2P message

Gavin
Andresen

Standard

Final

62

Consensus
(soft fork)

Dealing with
malleability

Pieter Wuille

Standard

Withdrawn

63

Applications

Stealth Addresses

Peter Todd

Standard

BIP
number
allocated

64

Peer Services

getutxo message

Mike Hearn

Standard

Draft

65

Consensus
(soft fork)

OP_CHECKLOCKTIME
VERIFY

Peter Todd

Standard

Final

66

Consensus
(soft fork)

Strict DER signatures

Pieter Wuille

Standard

Final

Applications

Deterministic Pay-toscript-hash multisignature addresses
through public key
sorting

Thomas Kerin,
Jean-Pierre
Rupp, Ruben
de Vries

Standard

Proposed

Consensus
(soft fork)

Relative lock-time
using consensusenforced sequence
numbers

Mark
Friedenbach,
BtcDrak,
Nicolas Dorier,
kinoshitajona

Standard

Final

69

Applications

Lexicographical
Indexing of
Transaction Inputs
and Outputs

Kristov Atlas

Informational

Proposed

70

Applications

Payment Protocol

Gavin
Andresen,
Mike Hearn

Standard

Final

71

Applications

Payment Protocol
MIME types

Gavin
Andresen

Standard

Final

67

68
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Applications

bitcoin: uri extensions
for Payment Protocol

Gavin
Andresen

Standard

Final

73

Applications

Use "Accept" header
for response type
negotiation with
Payment Request
URLs

Stephen Pair

Standard

Final

74

Applications

Allow zero value
OP_RETURN in
Payment Protocol

Toby Padilla

Standard

Draft

Applications

Out of Band Address
Exchange using
Payment Protocol
Encryption

Justin Newton,
Matt David,
Aaron Voisine,
James
MacWhyte

Standard

Draft

80

Hierarchy for NonColored Voting Pool
Deterministic Multisig
Wallets

Justus Ranvier,
Jimmy Song

Informational

Deferred

81

Hierarchy for Colored
Voting Pool
Deterministic Multisig
Wallets

Justus Ranvier,
Jimmy Song

Informational

Deferred

72

75

83

Applications

Dynamic Hierarchical
Deterministic Key
Trees

Eric Lombrozo

Standard

Draft

84

Applications

Derivation scheme
for P2WPKH based
accounts

Pavol Rusnak

Informational

Draft

90

Consensus
(hard fork)

Buried Deployments

Suhas Daftuar

Informational

Draft

91

Consensus
(soft fork)

Reduced threshold
Segwit MASF

James Hilliard

Standard

Final
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98

Consensus
(soft fork)

99

Fast Merkle Trees

Mark
Friedenbach,
Kalle Alm,
BtcDrak

Standard

Draft

Motivation and
deployment of
consensus rule
changes
([soft/hard]forks)

Jorge Timón

Informational

Draft

101

Consensus
(hard fork)

Increase maximum
block size

Gavin
Andresen

Standard

Withdrawn

102

Consensus
(hard fork)

Block size increase to
2MB

Jeff Garzik

Standard

Draft

103

Consensus
(hard fork)

Block size following
technological growth

Pieter Wuille

Standard

Draft

104

Consensus
(hard fork)

'Block75' - Max block
size like difficulty

t.khan

Standard

Draft

105

Consensus
(hard fork)

Consensus based
block size retargeting
algorithm

BtcDrak

Standard

Draft

106

Consensus
(hard fork)

Dynamically
Controlled Bitcoin
Block Size Max Cap

Upal
Chakraborty

Standard

Draft

107

Consensus
(hard fork)

Dynamic limit on the
block size

Washington Y.
Sanchez

Standard

Draft

109

Consensus
(hard fork)

Two million byte size
limit with sigop and
sighash limits

Gavin
Andresen

Standard

Rejected

111

Peer Services

NODE_BLOOM
service bit

Matt Corallo,
Peter Todd

Standard

Proposed
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112

Consensus
(soft fork)

CHECKSEQUENCEVERI
FY

BtcDrak, Mark
Friedenbach,
Eric Lombrozo

Standard

Final

113

Consensus
(soft fork)

Median time-past as
endpoint for locktime calculations

Thomas Kerin,
Mark
Friedenbach

Standard

Final

114

Consensus
(soft fork)

Merkelized Abstract
Syntax Tree

Johnson Lau

Standard

Draft

115

Consensus
(soft fork)

Generic anti-replay
protection using
Script

Luke Dashjr

Standard

Draft

116

Consensus
(soft fork)

MERKLEBRANCHVERI
FY

Mark
Friedenbach,
Kalle Alm,
BtcDrak

Standard

Draft

117

Consensus
(soft fork)

Tail Call Execution
Semantics

Mark
Friedenbach,
Kalle Alm,
BtcDrak

Standard

Draft

120

Applications

Proof of Payment

Kalle
Rosenbaum

Standard

Withdrawn

121

Applications

Proof of Payment URI
scheme

Kalle
Rosenbaum

Standard

Withdrawn

Applications

URI scheme for
Blockchain references
/ exploration

Marco Pontello

Standard

Draft

BIP Classification

Eric Lombrozo

Process

Active

Hierarchical
Deterministic Script
Templates

Eric Lombrozo,
William
Swanson

Informational

Draft

122

123

124

Applications

135

125

Applications

126

Opt-in Full Replaceby-Fee Signaling

David A.
Harding, Peter
Todd

Standard

Proposed

Best Practices for
Heterogeneous Input
Script Transactions

Kristov Atlas

Informational

Draft

130

Peer Services

sendheaders message

Suhas Daftuar

Standard

Proposed

131

Consensus
(hard fork)

"Coalescing
Transaction"
Specification
(wildcard inputs)

Chris Priest

Standard

Draft

Committee-based BIP
Acceptance Process

Andy Chase

Process

Withdrawn

132

133

Peer Services

feefilter message

Alex Morcos

Standard

Draft

134

Consensus
(hard fork)

Flexible Transactions

Tom Zander

Standard

Draft

Generalized version
bits voting

Sancho Panza

Informational

Draft

135

140

Consensus
(soft fork)

Normalized TXID

Christian
Decker

Standard

Draft

141

Consensus
(soft fork)

Segregated Witness
(Consensus layer)

Eric Lombrozo,
Johnson Lau,
Pieter Wuille

Standard

Final

142

Applications

Address Format for
Segregated Witness

Johnson Lau

Standard

Withdrawn

143

Consensus
(soft fork)

Transaction Signature
Verification for
Version 0 Witness
Program

Johnson Lau,
Pieter Wuille

Standard

Final

144

Peer Services

Segregated Witness
(Peer Services)

Eric Lombrozo,
Pieter Wuille

Standard

Final
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145

API/RPC

getblocktemplate
Updates for
Segregated Witness

146

Consensus
(soft fork)

Dealing with
signature encoding
malleability

Johnson Lau,
Pieter Wuille

Standard

Draft

147

Consensus
(soft fork)

Dealing with dummy
stack element
malleability

Johnson Lau

Standard

Final

148

Consensus
(soft fork)

Mandatory activation
of segwit deployment

Shaolin Fry

Standard

Final

149

Consensus
(soft fork)

Segregated Witness
(second deployment)

Shaolin Fry

Standard

Withdrawn

150

Peer Services

Peer Authentication

Jonas Schnelli

Standard

Draft

151

Peer Services

Peer-to-Peer
Communication
Encryption

Jonas Schnelli

Standard

Draft

152

Peer Services

Compact Block Relay

Matt Corallo

Standard

Draft

154

Peer Services

Rate Limiting via peer
specified challenges

Karl-Johan Alm

Standard

Draft

157

Peer Services

Client Side Block
Filtering

Olaoluwa
Osuntokun,
Alex Akselrod,
Jim Posen

Standard

Draft

158

Peer Services

Compact Block Filters
for Light Clients

Olaoluwa
Osuntokun,
Alex Akselrod

Standard

Draft

159

Peer Services

NODE_NETWORK_LI
MITED service bit

Jonas Schnelli

Standard

Draft

171

Applications

Currency/exchange
rate information API

Luke Dashjr

Standard

Draft

Luke Dashjr

Standard

Final
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173

Applications

Base32 address
format for native v016 witness outputs

174

Applications

Partially Signed
Bitcoin Transaction
Format

Andrew Chow

Standard

Draft

175

Applications

Pay to Contract
Protocol

Omar Shibli,
Nicholas
Gregory

Informational

Draft

Bits Denomination

Jimmy Song

Informational

Draft

176

Pieter Wuille,
Greg Maxwell

Informational

Proposed

180

Peer Services

Block size/weight
fraud proof

Luke Dashjr

Standard

Draft

199

Applications

Hashed Time-Locked
Contract transactions

Sean Bowe,
Daira
Hopwood

Standard

Draft

138

Appendix E A Sample BIP (BIP #151)
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140

141

142

143

Appendix F Fs-QCA Calibration
1. Calibration of Machine Consensus Mechanisms
I used explanatory conditions’ Q1 values to explain growth (or decline) from Q1 to Q2.
Security Provision: I calibrated security provision based on the extent to which proof-ofwork (PoW) mining was used in Q1. PoW cryptocurrencies received scores greater than
0.5, while Proof-of-Stake (PoS) cryptocurrencies received scores below 0.5. A full
membership (1) in security provision was assigned when the cryptocurrency was based
solely on SHA-256 proof-of-work, the algorithm used by Bitcoin. SHA-256 is the most
intensive algorithm in terms of computing power, and it requires specialized hardware
designed to carry out heavy-duty computing tasks. In addition to SHA-256, other proofof-work cryptocurrencies have used algorithms such as Scrypt (e.g., Litecoin) and X11
(e.g., Dash) that require less computing power. These were coded as less than 1.
DAOs with a hybrid design (e.g., Peercoin and Novacoin), which run PoS and PoW
simultaneously, were calibrated between 0 and 0.5, depending on the degree to which
they incorporate PoW. These DAOs use only PoW for the initial issuance and distribution
of the cryptocurrency, and PoW is therefore non-essential in the long run (King & Nadal,
2012; King, interview #3). Some PoSe designs use PoW in the first two to three weeks
for coin distribution and then become purely PoS (i.e., PoW discontinues) after the initial
period. A PoS design that has never incorporated PoW was considered as pure PoS and
coded as 0 (e.g., Paycoin).
In sum, beyond the 0.5 anchor, PoW dominates the payment validation process.
Stability provision: I calibrated stability provision by calculating the variance of network
validation difficulty. I first normalized the raw difficulty data to make it comparable
across cryptocurrencies. I then calculated a moving 14-day variance, and computed the
quarterly average for Q1. The 0.5 anchor was set at the median score in our sample (0.8).
A full membership (1) was assigned to variances over 1.0, indicating very high difficulty
fluctuation. Conversely, a non-membership (0) was assigned to variances below 0.3,
indicating very low difficulty fluctuation.
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2. Calibration of Social Consensus Mechanisms
Breadth of stakeholder discussions: I capture it by calculating the monthly number of
unique contributors working on the code repository of the cryptocurrency. I chose the
median—20, to be the 0.5 qualitative anchor. I assigned a full membership (1) to cases
with over 40 unique contributors and a non-membership (0) to cases with fewer than one
contributor.
Depth of stakeholder discussions: To capture the depth of stakeholder discussion, I
calculated monthly code frequency changes, i.e., the average number of additions and
deletions to the cryptocurrency source code on GitHub for Q1. I calibrated the 0.5
qualitative anchor at 30,000, the median observed in our sample. I assigned a full
membership of 1 to a code frequency over 60,000, indicating a high depth of stakeholder
discussions. And we assigned a non-membership (0) for a code frequency below 1,000,
indicating a low depth of stakeholder discussions.
Validators’ commitment: The network hash rate measures the aggregate computing
power of the cryptocurrency network. I set the 0.5 anchor at the sample median hash rate
of 1 Ghash/sec. A large mining network typically contains substantial computing power
with a hash rate over 100 Ghash/sec, to which I allocated a full membership. Conversely,
a network with a hash rate below 0.01 Ghash/sec was allocated a non-membership (0).
3. Calibration of Decentralization of Strategy Making
I calibrated it by jointly considering three dimensions: the design philosophy, the
presence of an active foundation, and whether the founder’s identity was known. I first
evaluated each dimension individually and determined its degree of decentralization; I
then combined the three dimensions to generate the final calibration for decentralization.
Our logic closely follows Crilly et al. (2012: 1435, Table 2), in which evaluations of
high, medium, and low memberships are given to each category of CSR-related criteria,
before they are pooled together for calibration.
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Active foundations: As I have noted, the presence of an active foundation signals more
centralized control of a cryptocurrency. I considered cryptocurrencies that have active
foundations to be low in decentralization, and cryptocurrencies without active
foundations to be high in decentralization.
Founders’ identity: I considered those cryptocurrency DAOs with known founders to be
low in decentralization. DAOs with pseudonymous and unknown founders were
considered to have a mid-range or high level of decentralization, respectively.
Design philosophy: At one end of the spectrum, some cryptocurrencies have a more
centralized design philosophy. For example, some business-oriented cryptocurrencies
resemble business entities in that they have a clear strategic orientation. These
cryptocurrencies are concerned with growing the network with incentive systems,
business development plans, and interorganizational alliance strategies (e.g., Litecoin,
Dash, and Worldcoin). Some consider themselves as DAOs governed by the network of
“investor volunteers” or “master nodes” with decision and voting rights (Daniel Diaz,
2016, interview #2). DAOs in this category were considered low in decentralization.
At the other end of the decentralization spectrum, I find more decentralized DAOs
focused on the social dimension. Such DAOs are established with formative ideologies
and value propositions built into their design. For example, Dogecoin appealed to the
community by promoting awareness of cryptocurrencies and backing charitable causes
(e.g. the NASCAR Sprint Cup Series rally). DAOs in this category are considered to have
a mid-range level of decentralization.
Finally, innovation-oriented DAOs that focus on decentralization received a higher score.
In contrast to cryptocurrencies with a business-oriented model, these DAOs see
themselves as technology leaders governed by meritocracy. For example, Namecoin aims
to protect free speech and prevent Internet censorship by assigning domain names that
cannot easily be tracked by centralized organizations or governmental agencies. In
addition, Bitcoin and Peercoin promote disintermediation and mining efficiency based on
technological innovations.
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I combined the three dimensions for each case. I allocated a full membership (1) to DAOs
that were highly decentralized in all three dimensions and non-membership (0) to those
that were low in all three dimensions. The 0.5 anchor indicates DAOs with mid-range
scores and inconsistent decentralization profiles, in line with the calibration strategy
proposed by Crilly et al. (2012).
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